



PAN-AMERICAN CRISIS MONITORING ORGANIZATION

MONTHLY REGIONAL CRISIS OUTLOOK

AUGUST 2026 | Issue No. 2

Anticipatory analysis for humanitarian posture — 30- and 90-day horizons

Coverage period: 3 August – 2 November 2026

PUBLIC RELEASE — NOT FOR OPERATIONAL RELIANCE WITHOUT INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION

Document No. PACMO-OUT-2026-08 | Published 3 August 2026 | Next scheduled issue: 7 September 2026

Document Control

Field	Entry
Document number	PACMO-OUT-2026-08
Version	1.0
Publication date	3 August 2026
Coverage period	30-day primary horizon to 2 September 2026; 90-day extended horizon to 2 November 2026
Supersedes	PACMO-OUT-2026-07 (13 July 2026) for current-state figures. Issue No. 1 remains the authoritative record of the judgments registered on 13 July; this issue does not revise those judgments, only resolves and reports against them.
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Status	Second issue. Section 5 resolves two of the eight forecast components registered in Issue No. 1, reports interim tracking for the remaining six, and registers ten new components across nine judgments (KJ-7 to KJ-15).
Corrections & changes	Three corrections to Issue No. 1 are recorded below under Corrections.
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Corrections to Issue No. 1

Ref	Correction
C-1	§3.1 and §1 described the US\$296 million Venezuela requirement as a 'UN flash appeal.' It is an addendum to the 2026 Venezuela Humanitarian Response Plan, not a standalone flash appeal, and OCHA situation reports from 15 July onward state the figure as US\$299 million. The addendum targets 1.3 million earthquake-affected people, raises the plan's overall target population from 5.5 million to 6.2 million, and raises total plan requirements from US\$632 million to US\$931 million. Corrected in §3.1 of this issue.
C-2	§3.1 located the M7.5 event 'near Yumare.' That reflects the USGS event name for the first shock. USGS locates the M7.2 foreshock near Yumare, in Verdes Municipality, Yaracuy, and the M7.5 mainshock offshore in the Caribbean Sea off the La Guaira coast, west of Catia La Mar, on the San Sebastián fault system. OCHA's 'San Felipe-Yumare-Montalbán axis' formulation describes the foreshock epicentral zone. The concentration of structural loss on the La Guaira coast reflects proximity to the mainshock epicentre, not shaking amplification from a distant source. Both formulations are used in this issue, with the event they describe named.
C-3	§3.1 stated the inter-event interval as 39 seconds, following the US Department of State. USGS and other sources report approximately 30 seconds. PACMO reports the interval as approximately 30–39 seconds pending a published seismological determination. No operational consequence.

Standard caveat

PACMO projections are probabilistic assessments intended to inform preparedness posture. They are not deterministic predictions and are not a substitute for official warnings issued by national authorities. Probability and confidence terms are defined in Annex A and used consistently throughout. PACMO does not issue earthquake predictions; seismic content is limited to exposure analysis, scenario planning, and operational aftershock forecasting drawn from published scientific sources. All casualty and damage figures for ongoing events are preliminary and subject to revision; where official and independent counts diverge materially, both are reported. Probability bands published in a prior issue are never revised after the fact; where new evidence would justify a different band, PACMO registers a new judgment rather than editing an old one.

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1. Regional Operating Picture

One month on from the inaugural issue, the hemisphere's risk picture has changed in three specific ways, and the changes matter more than the continuities.

First, the El Niño signal has sharpened from a developing driver into the organising variable of the quarter. NOAA's Climate Prediction Center moved to an El Niño Advisory on 11 June and, in its 9 July diagnostic discussion, states that the event will strengthen through the end of the year with a 97 per cent chance it persists through early spring 2027. CPC separately publishes an 81 per cent probability of a very strong event during October–December, which would rank among the largest in the record since 1950 [1]. That single variable is now simultaneously suppressing Atlantic cyclone activity, amplifying the Eastern Pacific season, sustaining the Dry Corridor rainfall deficit, drying northern South America — including the Venezuela recovery zone — and setting the conditions for the Amazon dry season. Organisations that treated El Niño as a background note in July should treat it in August as the common cause behind four of the nine assessments in this issue.

Second, Haiti's August electoral trigger has moved. On 27 July the Provisional Electoral Council published a revised calendar cancelling the 30 August first round and setting first-round presidential, legislative and referendum voting for 13 December 2026, with a second round on 21 February 2027 [2][3]. Polling day itself now falls outside both the cyclone season and the rainy-season disease window, which is operationally better than August. The risk has not gone away; it has been redistributed. Voter registration runs to 13 October and the campaign opens on 5 October, so the security-exposed, mass-participation phases of the process sit squarely inside the cyclone peak and the rainy season while polling day does not. Displacement-contingency capacity staged for August should be held and re-dated, not released.

Third, the concurrency problem has changed shape. Issue No. 1 framed the regional capacity constraint as two large responses competing for the same surge resources. It is now at least four. Cuba's electricity, water and health-service crisis has deepened to the point where the national emergency-response system itself depends on fuel and power the country does not have — immediately before the Atlantic season peak. Colombia enters the second half of 2026 with 10.4 million people projected to need assistance and access denial, not needs identification, as the binding constraint. Both are assessed in full for the first time in this issue.

Against that, the Venezuela response has passed a phase boundary. Search and rescue has ended — no survivor has been recovered since 2 July — foreign teams have largely withdrawn, and international attention has fallen sharply while the caseload has not [4]. OCHA's situation reporting of 22 July gives an official toll of 5,398 dead and 16,740 injured; a National Assembly statement of 24 July gives 5,546 dead against the same injured figure. PACMO reports both. Roughly 23,000–24,000 people are in 107 state-run transitional camps, alongside an unquantified population sleeping outside damaged buildings awaiting structural evaluation [4][5][6]. Financing has partly opened — an IMF reserve-tranche release of US\$346 million, and a US\$299 million HRP addendum targeting 1.3 million people that raises total plan requirements from US\$632 million to US\$931 million — but the updated plan still faced a US\$627 million gap in early July [4][7][8]. The structural-evaluation bottleneck PACMO identified as the binding constraint in Issue No. 1 remains the binding constraint.

One correction of record travels with that financing picture. A US\$37 billion figure is now widely reported as the cost of Venezuela's recovery. PACMO assesses that this is most likely the UNDRR direct physical damage estimate being re-described. Direct damage and recovery cost are different quantities, and recovery cost normally exceeds direct damage substantially. Until a costed recovery framework is published, cite US\$37 billion as a damage estimate and treat recovery cost as not yet established (§3.1).

The highest-leverage action available this month is unchanged from last month and is now close to expiring: anticipatory cash and drought-tolerant seed delivered before Central American postrera planting in August–September. One favourable development supports it. The fuel and fertiliser price shock that FEWS NET flagged as a driver of reduced input use has partly reversed since the Strait of Hormuz reopened in mid-June, with urea leading a broad fertiliser price decline [9]. That makes input support cheaper per household in August than it was in May. It does not make the rainfall deficit smaller.

Key judgments this month

Judgment numbering continues from Issue No. 1 so that the register is cumulative. KJ-1 through KJ-6 remain live or resolved in Section 5; KJ-7 through KJ-15 are new. Every component below has a fixed resolution date and criterion in Section 5.

- **KJ-7: It is likely (55–80%)** that more than 15,000 people remain in official Venezuelan transitional camps on 2 November 2026. (Moderate confidence — housing delivery pledged at 4,000 units by December against a caseload an

order of magnitude larger, and structural-evaluation throughput remains the constraint on both entries to and exits from the caseload.)

- **KJ-8:** There is a **roughly even chance (45–55%)** that earthquake-affected health services in Venezuela experience a documented multi-facility interruption or rationing of essential care — chronic-disease medication, dialysis or equivalent — caused by medical-supply shortage before 2 November 2026. (*Moderate confidence — an operating partner has publicly stated approximately one month of remaining donated stock, but government, donor or commercial resupply could prevent an observable service consequence.*)
- **KJ-9:** It is **likely (55–80%)** that the CEP or the Government of Haiti publicly announces a change to at least one date in the 27 July electoral calendar before 2 November 2026. (*Low confidence — the base rate of Haitian electoral slippage is very high and nine calendar milestones fall inside the horizon, but those milestones are administrative rather than security-dependent, and the CEP has strong political incentives to hold published dates.*)
- **KJ-10:** It is **very likely (80–95%)** that CPC categorises the 2026–27 El Niño as strong or greater at peak, and **very likely (80–95%)** that it is categorised as very strong. (*Moderate-to-high confidence — CPC publishes an 81 per cent probability of a very strong event during October–December, and 23 of 26 models in IRI’s mid-July ensemble forecast a very strong peak. Residual uncertainty is in the magnitude of the peak rather than in whether a strong event occurs.*) This sharpens, and does not replace, KJ-3b.
- **KJ-11:** It is **likely (55–80%)** that at least one Amazon Basin state or department in Brazil, Peru or Bolivia declares a drought or low-water emergency affecting riverine communities before 2 November 2026. (*Moderate confidence — Amazonas civil defence and the commercial sector are already pre-positioning against a repeat of 2024, and the Brazilian Geological Survey’s median vazante scenario is well below normal.*)
- **KJ-12:** It is **likely (55–80%)** that Amazon-biome fire activity during August–October 2026 exceeds the same period in 2025. (*Moderate confidence — 2025 was an unusually low base following the end of the previous El Niño; the dominant uncertainty is enforcement and fire-ban policy, not climate.*)
- **KJ-13:** It is **very likely (80–95%)** that Cuba experiences at least one further national or multi-province grid collapse before 2 November 2026. (*High confidence — four total network collapses in 2026 to date, two of them in July; a July generation deficit exceeding 2,300 MW against demand of roughly 3,100 MW; and announced capacity additions the government itself acknowledges cannot close the gap.*)
- **KJ-14:** It is **very likely (80–95%)** that Colombia records at least one new mass-displacement event affecting 5,000 or more people between 3 August and 2 November 2026. (*Moderate confidence — consistent with 2025–26 base rates and continuing armed-group territorial competition; attribution and reporting lags are the main uncertainty.*)
- **KJ-15:** It is **likely (55–80%)** that earthquake-relief-specific transaction authority under the US Venezuela sanctions programme is extended, replaced or otherwise maintained beyond the 23 October 2026 expiry of OFAC General License 60. (*Moderate confidence — OFAC’s 2026 pattern has been sustained incremental easing, including GL 59, GL 24A, GL 5X and amendments to seven existing Venezuela general licenses, and the FinCEN enforcement-relief policy issued on 27 July runs to 29 January 2027, implying an expectation of continued authorised activity. Against that, GL 60 was deliberately time-bound to four months and PACMO has no insight into Treasury intent.*)

Sources for this section: [1] NOAA CPC, ENSO Diagnostic Discussion, 9 Jul 2026, and CPC Official ENSO Strength Probabilities (RONI) — cpc.ncep.noaa.gov. [2] Conseil Électoral Provisoire, Note de presse CEP/DC/028-2526, ‘Publication officielle du calendrier électoral 2026-2027’, 27 Jul 2026 — cephaiti.ht. [3] Reuters, ‘Haiti electoral council schedules long-delayed presidential vote for December’, 27 Jul 2026. [4] The New Humanitarian, ‘Venezuela in-depth: attention fades even as earthquake needs spiral’, 28 Jul 2026. [5] OCHA, Earthquakes in Venezuela Situation Report No. 29, 22 Jul 2026 — unocha.org. [6] Euronews, ‘Venezuela’s twin earthquakes: the toll one month later’, 25 Jul 2026. [7] Al Jazeera, ‘Venezuela quake death toll tops 5,000 as IMF releases emergency aid’, 18 Jul 2026. [8] OCHA, ‘UN relief chief urges scaled-up support for Venezuela’s earthquake recovery’, Jul 2026 — unocha.org. [9] FEWS NET, Global Price Watch, 31 Jul 2026 — fewsn.net.

2. Regional Risk at a Glance

Entries are included when they represent an active crisis with material humanitarian consequences, a developing hazard with a credible path to such consequences during the assessment horizon, or a cross-cutting driver with material implications for multiple regional crises. Severity is assessed relative to country-specific baseline and residual response capacity under Annex B; caseload is one input, not an automatic tier threshold. Current severity is used for realised crises. Watches and advisories are not independently tiered unless they are producing measurable current consequences; conditional scenarios may use illustrative tiers tied to the specific country and event. Probability language is defined in Annex A.

Crisis ID	Crisis	Status	30-day trajectory	Severity assessment	Change from Issue No. 1	§
PACMO-2026- VEN-001	Venezuela earthquake emergency	Active	Transitioning to early recovery; needs rising, attention and surge capacity falling	Current Tier 4; Tier 5 escalation potential retained but assessed lower	Severity unchanged; escalation potential reduced	3.1
PACMO-2026- HTI-002	Haiti complex emergency	Active	Deteriorating; electoral risk window moved to December	Current Tier 5	Unchanged	3.2
PACMO-2026- CAM-003	Dry Corridor lean season / El Niño	Active	Lean-season peak; postrera window closing	Current regional Tier 3; Tier 4 escalation potential	Unchanged; input costs eased	3.3
PACMO-2026- REG-004	El Niño 2026–27 hemispheric impacts	Watch	Strengthening; very strong peak now the central expectation	Not independently tiered	Signal materially stronger	3.4
PACMO-2026- REG-005	2026 Atlantic & Eastern Pacific cyclone seasons	Advisory	Atlantic suppressed; Eastern Pacific running ahead of pace	Conditional scenarios only	Basin asymmetry sharpened	3.5
PACMO-2026- REG-006	Measles multi-country outbreak	Active	Regional transmission declining; reporting basis changed	Current regional Tier 2; Guatemala country-level Tier 3	Country-level tier added	3.6
PACMO-2026- CUB-007	Cuba energy, water and health-service emergency	Active — NEW	Deteriorating; peak cyclone exposure ahead	Current Tier 4	New entry	3.7
PACMO-2026- REG-008	Amazon Basin dry season, low water and fire	Watch — NEW	Developing; vazante and fire season Aug–Nov	Not independently tiered; conditional Tier 3 scenario	New entry	3.8
PACMO-2026- COL-009	Colombia armed-conflict displacement and access crisis	Active — NEW	Deteriorating; access denial expanding	Current national Tier 3; subregional Tier 4 in Catatumbo, Chocó, Cauca and Nariño	New entry	3.9

Status categories. Active — a realised event or crisis producing current humanitarian consequences. Watch — a developing driver or situation requiring monitoring but not yet producing material current consequences, or not meeting the active-entry criteria. Advisory — a seasonal or conditional hazard warranting readiness action despite no active event affecting populated areas.

A note on the three new entries. Cuba and Colombia are not new crises; they were under-weighted in Issue No. 1, which concentrated on the two events then dominating regional surge capacity. Adding them changes PACMO's assessment of the concurrency problem rather than the assessment of any single country. The Amazon entry is genuinely new to the horizon: it is the first of the El Niño-driven consequences flagged in Issue No. 1 §3.4 to move from abstract to dated.

3. Operational Area Assessments

3.1 Venezuela Earthquake Emergency — PACMO-2026-VEN-001

Field	Assessment
Status	Active — transition from emergency stabilisation to early recovery, week 6
Hazard type	Seismic — M7.2 foreshock and M7.5 mainshock, 24 June, approximately 30–39 seconds apart, with a decaying aftershock sequence; secondary landslide, WASH-failure and epidemic risks; compounding El Niño drying risk to water sources
Operating area	Yaracuy, Carabobo, Aragua, Falcón, Miranda, Capital District (Caracas) and La Guaira. USGS locates the M7.2 foreshock near Yumare (Veroes Municipality, Yaracuy) and the M7.5 mainshock offshore off the La Guaira coast west of Catia La Mar; OCHA describes the foreshock epicentral zone as the San Felipe–Yumare–Montalbán axis. The heaviest structural loss is on the La Guaira coast [1][2]
Probability	Event realised. Continued M5+ aftershocks through the 12 October horizon: see the KJ-1 tracking note in Section 5 — observed magnitudes are decaying faster than the Issue No. 1 judgment assumed
Confidence	High on hazard trajectory and response phase; moderate on caseload; low on the unrecovered-missing figure
Caseload / exposure	1.3M targeted under the US\$299M HRP addendum; 6.2M under the full revised 2026 HRP; approximately 23,000–24,000 in 107 state-run transitional camps; an unquantified additional population in informal settlements and sleeping outside damaged buildings [2][3][4]
Severity assessment	Current severity: Tier 4. Rationale: multi-state service disruption, extensive uninhabitable housing, degraded health capacity and limited residual fiscal and institutional capacity atop 7.9M people already requiring assistance. Tier 5 escalation potential is retained but assessed lower than in Issue No. 1, because search and rescue has concluded, camp management is established, and external financing channels have partly opened. Escalation paths now run through service collapse and disease rather than through undiscovered caseload.
Sustainment outlook	Acute phase closing; recovery phase opening. Government estimates six to eight months to relocate and stabilise families. A US\$37 billion figure is now widely reported as a recovery cost; see the caution below. Plan WASH, shelter and continuity-of-care as multi-year, not multi-month, requirements [4][5]

Operational environment

Six weeks after the 24 June sequence, the response has crossed a phase boundary that is not reflected in the funding picture. No survivor has been recovered since 2 July; most foreign urban search-and-rescue teams have departed; international media attention has fallen sharply. Needs have not fallen with it. OCHA situation reporting of 22 July gives 5,398 dead and 16,740 injured; a National Assembly statement of 24 July gives 5,546 dead against the same injured figure — up from the 4,490 PACMO reported on 12 July [3][6]. PACMO reports both counts and their dates. The injured figure has been unchanged since 7 July, which suggests the mortality count is now being driven by body recovery from rubble rather than by deaths in care. Tens of thousands remain formally unaccounted for; PACMO assesses that figure with low confidence and does not treat it as a projection of additional deaths, because it conflates the missing, the displaced and the uncontactable.

Aftershock counts vary by source and date: OCHA reported 1,463 aftershocks as of 22 July, while official statements around 24 July cite approximately 1,405 [3][6]. More operationally relevant than the count is the magnitude distribution. FUNVISIS records the largest aftershock of the sequence as mb 5.0, on 24 June itself; events reported through July have overwhelmingly been below M4.0 [1][7]. The sequence is decaying normally and, so far, faster in magnitude than the Issue No. 1 judgment assumed. This is reported here rather than buried in Section 5 because it has a direct posture implication: the case for holding heavy trauma surge capacity in theatre through October is weaker than it was in July, while the case for holding structural-engineering capacity is unchanged.

The structural-evaluation bottleneck identified in Issue No. 1 remains the binding constraint on every downstream caseload. The government has established an inter-ministerial technical commission to evaluate housing and infrastructure damage, and buildings in affected neighbourhoods now carry yellow, red or green tags from a presidential assessment commission [5][8]. Residents describe the tagging as provisional and subject to re-inspection, and thousands

continue to sleep outside damaged apartment buildings while waiting for a determination [5]. Reporting from early July indicates more than 28,000 Venezuelans have homes at risk of collapse [7]. The government delivered a first 240 permanent homes on 20 July and has pledged 4,000 by December — a rate that does not converge with the caseload within the planning horizon [5].

Health-service capacity is the second-order emergency. The government reports 38 hospitals damaged. An early-July International Rescue Committee assessment found 1,038 health workers serving 1.77 million earthquake-affected people across Caracas, Miranda and La Guaira; mobile teams report a surge in demand for chronic-disease and prenatal care displaced out of hospitals now prioritising trauma, and MSF reports rising mental-health need [5]. Cáritas Venezuela reports that donated medication stocks will sustain services for roughly one further month, after which the pre-existing structural shortage reasserts itself [5]. That is a dated, actionable warning: the medical-supply cliff falls inside this issue's 30-day horizon.

WASH conditions in displacement sites are the most likely near-term driver of excess morbidity. Camp residents report handwashing stations but few functioning toilets and almost no showers, alongside widespread diarrhoea; PAHO's public health situation analysis identifies overcrowding, intermittent safe-water access and inadequate sanitation as conditions favourable to waterborne disease, and PAHO is running surveillance in camps for acute diarrhoeal disease, acute respiratory infection, skin conditions and fever with rash [5][9]. Concrete dust over rubble sites is causing respiratory and ophthalmic presentations. PAHO has separately developed a protocol for vaccination in temporary shelters, reflecting a specific measles-importation concern addressed in §3.6 [10].

A caution on the US\$37 billion figure. Reporting in late July attributes a US\$37 billion recovery cost estimate to the UN. Issue No. 1 reported a UNDRR analytical estimate of approximately US\$37 billion in direct physical damage to buildings and infrastructure (roughly US\$24bn buildings, US\$13bn infrastructure), alongside a UNDP satellite-based estimate of US\$6.7 billion in direct physical damage to housing and economic assets. PACMO assesses that the widely circulated recovery-cost figure is most likely the UNDRR direct-damage estimate being re-described, and notes that direct physical damage and recovery cost are different quantities: recovery cost normally exceeds direct damage once demolition, temporary housing, service restoration, resilience upgrades and economic losses are included. Until a costed recovery framework is published, PACMO recommends citing US\$37 billion as a damage estimate and treating recovery cost as not yet established.

Financing has partly opened without closing the gap. The IMF released US\$346 million from Venezuela's reserve tranche; the government has asked the Bank of England to return 31 tonnes of gold worth roughly US\$4 billion; the US has provided more than US\$386 million in post-quake assistance; and OCHA's US\$299 million HRP addendum targets 1.3 million earthquake-affected people over six months, raising the plan's overall target from 5.5 million to 6.2 million people and total requirements from US\$632 million to US\$931 million [3][6][11]. As of early July the updated plan still faced a US\$627 million gap [12]. UNICEF has narrowed its earthquake target from 650,000 to 470,000 people while raising its requirement from US\$52 million to US\$65.7 million, reflecting a deeper per-person package rather than reduced ambition [13].

Two access and accountability constraints shape what international organisations can actually do. First, the response is politically contested: an AtlasIntel/Bloomberg poll of more than 2,500 people found 65.4 per cent disapproved of the government's handling of the disaster, and a Venezuelan transparency organisation has launched a public platform to track incoming aid [5]. Second, aid workers report militarised camps and conditions requiring operation under state control, and a substantial displaced population is avoiding official shelters outright — several people displaced in La Guaira explicitly cited the 1999 Vargas precedent, when some of the same shelter sites were used [5]. PACMO assesses that the population outside the official camp system is the least-served and least-measured caseload in this response, and that planning figures anchored only on the 23,000–24,000 official camp population will systematically understate need.

30/90-day operational outlook

Three drivers dominate the forward period, and they have shifted since Issue No. 1. First, habitability attrition is now less aftershock-driven and more evaluation-driven. With the sequence decaying in magnitude, the growth in the sheltered population is likely (55–80%) to come from completed structural evaluations condemning occupied buildings rather than from new failures. That makes evaluation throughput the pacing item for shelter demand, and it means shelter surges will arrive in administrative steps rather than after seismic events. Second, rainy-season WASH and landslide risk persists. The May–November rains are now established, and earthquake-loosened slopes in the coastal range continue to make localised deadly landslide events likely (55–80%) through the season; the 1999 Vargas geography remains the worst-case anchor for La Guaira. Third, and new to this issue, El Niño drying is a medium-term threat to the water solution itself. FAO's cross-hazard mapping names Venezuela among northern South American drying risks; reduced source availability during recovery would compound a damaged distribution network rather than merely coincide with it (§3.4).

A fourth factor is now dated, and the picture is more nuanced than Issue No. 1 conveyed. OFAC General License 60, issued on 25 June, authorises transactions related to earthquake relief and expires at 12:01 a.m. ET on 23 October 2026 — 81 days from this issue's publication date and inside the 90-day horizon [14]. Because the license lapses one minute after midnight, 22 October is the last full operating day under GL 60, a distinction with direct consequences for payment scheduling. Two further qualifications matter operationally. First, GL 60 supplements the pre-existing General License 29, which authorises NGOs to deal with the Government of Venezuela for humanitarian projects meeting basic human needs; a GL 60 lapse therefore narrows, rather than eliminates, authorised NGO activity [14][15]. Second, a FinCEN enforcement-relief policy covering authorised financial services took effect on 27 July and runs to 29 January 2027, roughly three months beyond GL 60's expiry [16]. Read alongside OFAC's wider 2026 pattern — GL 59 for Conviasa aviation and GL 24A for telecommunications, both on 18 June, GL 5X, and amendments easing governing-law requirements across seven existing Venezuela general licenses — PACMO reads the asymmetry as evidence that Treasury anticipates continued authorised relief activity past October, and registers KJ-15 accordingly. Organisations should nonetheless plan against expiry and treat extension as upside.

Priority operational objective and supporting priorities

Priority operational objective: convert first-pass screening into completed, nationally authorised occupancy determinations at a rate that clears the sleeping-outside population before the rains peak. Screening throughput was the constraint in July; determination throughput — the step that lets a family either go home or enter a shelter pathway — is the constraint now.

Supporting priorities: replenish the medical-supply pipeline before the one-month Cáritas stock horizon elapses; sustain and formalise WASH services in informal settlements outside the official camp system; establish shelter health surveillance with measles vaccination integrated; protect continuity of chronic-disease, dialysis, maternal and mental-health care; stage landslide-response capability along the coastal corridor; and complete GL-60-dependent procurement and payments before close of business on 22 October.

Critical capability requirements

Operational-scale descriptions identify the system-wide problem, priority areas and useful contribution types. They are not procurement targets for any single organisation; field requirements should be refined through nationally authorised assessments and sector coordination.

Priority capability	Required operational effect	Operational scale and priorities	Examples of scalable support	Decision window & sustainment
Structural safety determination	Move families out of limbo into either return or a shelter pathway	More than 28,000 households reported to have homes at risk of collapse; provisional tagging is being contested and re-inspected. Prioritise re-inspection backlogs, hospitals, schools and high-density residential blocks [7][8].	Support to nationally authorised building-safety evaluation teams; remote engineering review; standardised documentation; re-inspection capacity	Immediate. The binding constraint through at least October.
Medical supply continuity	Prevent a second health-service collapse when donated stocks run out	National and international donations have carried facilities through week six; a Venezuelan implementing partner reports approximately one month of remaining stock [5]. Prioritise chronic-disease medication, dialysis consumables and cold chain.	Medication resupply against verified facility lists; cold-chain support; dialysis consumables; freight and customs facilitation	Commit within 30 days — this window closes inside the primary horizon.
WASH outside the official camp system	Extend minimum safe water and sanitation to informal settlements	Dozens of informal camps across La Guaira and Caracas report irregular water trucking, no predictable sanitation and community-donated tents [5]. Prioritise sites identified through parish, community and NGO networks rather than official site lists alone.	Treatment units; scheduled trucking; latrine and shower installation; household treatment; chlorination; storage	Immediate; sustain through the rainy season and into network restoration.
Shelter health	Detect waterborne	107 official camps plus an	EWARS support;	Establish immediately;

Priority capability	Required operational effect	Operational scale and priorities	Examples of scalable support	Decision window & sustainment
surveillance and immunization	clusters early and close measles immunity gaps in camps	unenumerated informal caseload. PAHO camp surveillance covers acute diarrhoeal disease, acute respiratory infection, skin conditions and fever with rash; a shelter vaccination protocol exists [9][10].	environmental-health teams; vaccination teams and cold chain; larviciding	sustain through the rainy season.
Transitional shelter and rental support	Reduce the sleeping-outside and host-family caseload before rains peak	Government housing delivery stands at 240 units with 4,000 pledged by December against a far larger caseload [5]. Urban conditions favour rental support and host-family assistance over camp expansion.	Rental-support programming; host-family assistance; transitional-shelter support; NFI kits	Begin now; plan for multi-month, potentially multi-year, support.
Documentation and legal identity	Restore access to banking, benefits, inheritance and services	Death certificates are required to settle estates and access assistance; identity documents lost in rubble block bank, health and education access [5].	Civil-documentation support; legal aid; mobile registry facilitation; psychosocial support integrated with documentation services	Immediate; sustain through the recovery phase.

Recommended readiness actions

- **Re-scope offers from search-and-rescue to engineering and health-system continuity.** The rescue phase is over; organisations still framing Venezuela offers around trauma surge are offering the wrong thing.
- **Fund the medical-supply pipeline this month.** A dated, specific, one-month stock horizon has been publicly stated by an operating partner. This is the clearest short-fuse funding decision in this issue.
- **Build a service picture for the population outside official camps.** Parish, community and diaspora networks are already reaching these settlements; assessment and service coverage are not. Planning on official camp figures alone will understate need by an unknown but material margin.
- **Close GL-60-dependent transactions by close of business on 22 October.** GL 60 expires at 12:01 a.m. ET on 23 October, so 22 October is the last full operating day. Front-load procurement, banking arrangements and prepositioning, and document transactions against the license. Brief donors now on payment-channel risk after expiry.
- **Integrate measles vaccination into camp operations.** PAHO has published a shelter vaccination protocol precisely because Venezuela combines suboptimal coverage, surveillance gaps and displacement concentration during a regional outbreak (§3.6).
- **Plan water operations against a drying baseline.** Source availability in northern South America is projected to fall under El Niño; network repair assumptions that hold source yield constant will be optimistic.

Indicators and decision triggers

Indicator	Decision trigger and action
Aftershock $\geq M6.0$ within 50 km of Caracas–La Guaira (USGS/FUNVISIS, moment magnitude)	Escalation trigger: Flash Bulletin; assume increased failure risk among damaged or restricted-occupancy structures; surge trauma posture
Reported shortage-driven rationing, deferral or suspension of care at two or more earthquake-affected facilities	Health-sector escalation; activate emergency resupply and brief donors on continuity-of-care failure risk. Resolves KJ-8
Acute watery diarrhoea cluster in any camp or informal site (PAHO/national surveillance)	Activate acute watery diarrhoea investigation and treatment posture; escalate cholera-specific measures if confirmed
Confirmed measles case in any displacement site	Immediate outbreak-response immunization in and around the site; notify PAHO; reassess §3.6 country classification

Indicator	Decision trigger and action
Official camp population trend across consecutive OCHA situation reports	Rising: shelter-sector escalation and rental-support scale-up. Falling without corresponding housing delivery: verify whether exits are into safe housing or into unassessed informal accommodation
OFAC publication of an extension, successor authorisation or amendment to GL 60	Extension: sustain procurement planning past October. No action by mid-October: accelerate procurement, shift to GL 29-scope activity and brief donors on payment-channel risk. Resolves KJ-15
48-hour rainfall >100 mm in the coastal range (INAMEH/forecast models)	Landslide watch; preposition SAR along the Vargas-corridor communities

Sources: [1] USGS Earthquake Hazards Program, event pages for the 24 June 2026 M7.2 and M7.5 events — earthquake.usgs.gov. [2] OCHA, Earthquakes in Venezuela Situation Report No. 20, 13 Jul 2026 — unocha.org. [3] OCHA, Situation Report No. 29, 22 Jul 2026 — unocha.org. [4] Euronews, 'Venezuela's twin earthquakes: the toll one month later', 25 Jul 2026 — euronews.com. [5] The New Humanitarian, 'Venezuela in-depth: attention fades even as earthquake needs spiral', 28 Jul 2026 — thenewhumanitarian.org. [6] Al Jazeera, 'Venezuela quake death toll tops 5,000 as IMF releases emergency aid', 18 Jul 2026 — aljazeera.com. [7] FUNVISIS, seismic sequence reporting, Jun–Jul 2026 — funvisis.gob.ve; and El País, 'Más de 28.000 venezolanos tienen casas en peligro de derrumbe', 2 Jul 2026 — elpais.com. [8] UNICEF, Venezuela Humanitarian Situation Report No. 4 (Earthquake Response), 13 Jul 2026 — unicef.org. [9] PAHO, Public Health Situation Analysis: Venezuela earthquakes 2026 — paho.org. [10] PAHO, Regional Situation Report No. 7, Measles in the Region of the Americas, 17 Jul 2026 — paho.org. [11] US Embassy Caracas, update on US assistance to Venezuela, Jul 2026 — ve.usembassy.gov; and US Department of State, 'Responding to Venezuela Earthquakes' — state.gov. [12] OCHA, 'UN relief chief urges scaled-up support for Venezuela's earthquake recovery', Jul 2026 — unocha.org. [13] UNICEF, Venezuela Earthquake Response addendum to the 2026 HAC appeal, Jul 2026 — unicef.org. [14] US Treasury OFAC, Venezuela General License 60, 25 Jun 2026, and recent-action notice 20260625_33 — ofac.treasury.gov. [15] Charity & Security Network, 'What nonprofits need to know about Venezuela General License 60', 9 Jul 2026 — charityandsecurity.org. [16] FinCEN, enforcement-relief policy for authorised financial services related to Venezuela earthquake relief, effective 27 Jul 2026, expiring 29 Jan 2027 — fincen.gov.

3.2 Haiti Complex Emergency — PACMO-2026-HTI-002

Field	Assessment
Status	Active — protracted complex emergency, deteriorating
Hazard type	Complex: armed-group violence and displacement; acute food insecurity; epidemic (cholera resurgence, diphtheria, accumulated measles susceptibility); high cyclone exposure with minimal coping capacity
Operating area	Nationwide; violence concentrated in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and Centre/Artibonite departments, with displacement pressure into Grand Sud and Grand Nord
Probability	Ongoing. Further deterioration over 90 days: likely (55–80%)
Confidence	High on current-state figures; low on the electoral trajectory
Caseload / exposure	6.4M people requiring humanitarian assistance in 2026; 5.83M in IPC Phase 3 or worse (52 per cent of the analysed population), including approximately 1.9M in Phase 4; nearly 1.5M internally displaced [1][2][3]
Severity assessment	Current severity: Tier 5. Unchanged. Rationale: nationwide food insecurity and displacement, armed-group control of more than 85 per cent of the capital, degraded health and public services, access denial, and insufficient national and international capacity to meet current needs [4].
Sustainment outlook	Chronic, with the principal known milestone now moved to December: first-round elections 13 December 2026, second round 21 February 2027. Cyclone peak Aug–Oct and rainy-season disease transmission remain in-window

What changed this month

The single most consequential change in this issue is the collapse and replacement of Haiti's electoral calendar. The 30 August first round was suspended, and on 27 July the Provisional Electoral Council published a revised 2026–27 calendar as press note CEP/DC/028-2526, with a signed 28-step table [5]. The milestones that matter are: registration of party groupings and coalitions 13 July–14 August; accreditation of observers and journalists 3 July–18 August; voter registration 20 July–13 October; candidate registration 20 August–2 October; recruitment of voting-centre supervisors 31 August–26 September; recruitment of polling-station members 1 September–21 November; accreditation of party agents from 3 October; first-round campaign 5 October–12 December; publication of electoral rolls 13 November; first round 13 December 2026, held jointly with the popular ratification of proposed constitutional changes; ratification results 16 December; preliminary presidential and legislative results 19 December; definitive first-round results 9 January 2027; second round and territorial-collectivity elections 21 February 2027; definitive second-round results 7 March 2027, and definitive territorial results 12 March 2027 [5][6][7].

The CEP has approved 316 of 320 political parties and states that the calendar depends on an 'acceptable security climate' and on financial resources that have not been publicly detailed [5][7]. The CARICOM Eminent Persons Group welcomed the publication [6].

PACMO's assessment is that this is a retiming of risk rather than a reduction of it, with three specific consequences. First, the displacement-contingency capacity that Issue No. 1 recommended staging for August should be held and re-dated, not released; the voter-registration period running to 13 October is itself a security-exposed mass-participation process in territory largely controlled by armed groups, and the campaign opens on 5 October, inside the cyclone peak. Second, polling day in December falls outside both the hurricane season and the principal rainy-season transmission window, which is operationally better than August — but it places the electoral period against the annual funding transition, when partner budgets and staffing are least flexible. Third, and absent from most commentary, the calendar sets definitive presidential and legislative results on 7 March 2027 — a month after the 7 February constitutional handover date — and sets no date for a presidential inauguration. That is a scheduled governance gap rather than a contingent one, and it is carried on the Watch List (\$4).

Operational environment

Haiti remains the hemisphere's most severe protracted crisis and the operating environment has degraded measurably since Issue No. 1. OCHA recorded 185 security and humanitarian incidents between March and June 2026, against 91 in the preceding period — roughly a doubling [3]. UN reporting places more than 2,300 people killed since the start of 2026, with armed groups controlling more than 85 per cent of Port-au-Prince [12]. IOM now places internal displacement at nearly

1.5 million, up from the 1.4 million figure carried in Issue No. 1, with more than 300,000 of those in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area; more than 140,000 Haitians were forcibly returned to the country between January and June 2026, many arriving without identity documents or resources [2][12].

The sharpest deterioration this month is in gender-based violence, and it was absent from Issue No. 1. OCHA reports an alarming surge driven by insecurity and displacement: partners recorded more than 3,000 GBV incidents between April and June 2026, including more than 1,000 in June alone, bringing the first-half total to 5,500 — against just over 8,000 recorded across the whole of the previous year [2]. On a simple annualisation the 2026 caseload is tracking roughly a third above 2025, and the June figure alone implies acceleration rather than a level shift. PACMO treats this as the clearest quantified evidence in this issue that Haiti's protection environment is deteriorating faster than its food-security or displacement indicators suggest, and notes that GBV reporting characteristically understates incidence, so the direction of any measurement bias is toward under-count.

Food insecurity remains at 5.83 million people in Crisis or worse, including approximately 1.9 million in Emergency [1][3]. As noted in Issue No. 1, the current IPC snapshot does not report a population in Phase 5, and descriptions of 'famine-level conditions' should not be treated as an IPC classification. The next IPC analysis will set the baseline into the autumn; PACMO continues to assess it is unlikely (20–45%) to show improvement.

The health picture has a specific new dimension that PACMO under-weighted in Issue No. 1. Alongside the cholera resurgence, Haiti is running a diphtheria outbreak. Through the end of May 2026 Haiti reported 159 confirmed cases (157 by laboratory testing, two by epidemiological link) and five confirmed deaths, against 58 confirmed cases and four deaths in the same period of 2025; Haiti accounts for 159 of the 163 confirmed cases recorded region-wide in the first 21 weeks of 2026, and for all of the regional deaths [8]. Confirmed cases have been reported in all ten departments, concentrated in Ouest (58), Sud-Est (36) and Nord-Est (27), and 40 per cent occurred in people aged 20 or over — an immunity gap extending well beyond early childhood. Within displacement sites specifically, PAHO records 37 suspected and four confirmed cases in the Ouest department during 2026 and one suspected case in an Artibonite site, with reactive vaccination conducted at the affected site and two neighbouring sites and no further cases detected there [9]. Haiti's 2025 DPT3 coverage was 77 per cent, with only 44 per cent of municipalities reaching 80 per cent [8]. Diphtheria is an antitoxin-dependent, high-case-fatality disease, and WHO has flagged a global shortage of diphtheria antitoxin alongside uneven clinical capacity to administer it — which makes this a supply-lead-time problem, not only a surveillance one [10].

Separately, PAHO classifies Haiti as high risk for measles on the explicit basis that the last vaccination campaign was conducted in 2019 and approximately eight susceptible birth cohorts have accumulated since [11]. That is the single starkest immunisation figure in this issue: Haiti is one importation away from a large measles outbreak in a population concentrated in displacement sites, during a hemispheric outbreak year.

Cholera transmission continues against limited WASH access, with localised outbreaks recorded in displacement sites [9]. PACMO was unable to verify a current published weekly suspected-case count and therefore does not report one; the weekly MSPP/PAHO series remains the correct indicator. The delivery platform for all of this is itself degraded: PAHO reports that nationally 26 per cent of inpatient health facilities are fully functional, 49 per cent partially functional, 21 per cent non-functional and 4 per cent destroyed; in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, 37 per cent are fully functional, 13 per cent partially functional, 40 per cent non-functional and 10 per cent destroyed [9]. Campaign and outbreak-response plans should be built against that facility base, not against a nominal health-system map.

Financing remains the constraint that converts all of the above into unmet need. The 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (US\$880 million) was under 20 per cent funded as of April, and the global funding environment described in the 2026 Global Humanitarian Overview has not improved since [3][13].

30/90-day operational outlook

With polling day moved out of the primary horizon, the August–October window is dominated by seasonal and epidemiological risk, with one political process still inside it. Peak cyclone exposure (see §3.5): seasonal totals do not reduce Haiti's single-storm risk. Hurricane Melissa struck in October 2025 during a season whose named-storm and hurricane counts were below the 1991–2020 averages but which CSU nonetheless classified as above-normal; it killed at least 46 people in Haiti and damaged or destroyed nearly 842,400 homes and infrastructure assets [3][12]. A below-normal Atlantic forecast is not a reason to reduce Haiti posture, and PACMO restates that judgment more strongly this month than last. Peak rainy-season disease transmission: cholera, diphtheria and accumulated measles susceptibility converge in the same displacement sites. El Niño drought risk to Haitian agriculture: FAO has flagged this specifically; during the 2015–16 El Niño, Haitian harvests fell by up to 70 per cent and food insecurity doubled within months. With the current event now forecast to reach strong or very strong intensity (§3.4), that precedent deserves more weight than it received in Issue No. 1.

Voter registration through 13 October and the campaign opening on 5 October are the political processes inside the horizon. PACMO assesses it is likely (55–80%) that registration coverage in armed-group-controlled areas of the metropolitan area is materially incomplete, and that this becomes a contested political fact ahead of December rather than a resolved administrative one.

Critical capability requirements

Haiti's binding constraints are access and funding, not needs identification. Field requirements should be refined through current government, OCHA, IOM/DTM, health and nutrition reporting.

Priority capability	Required operational effect	Operational scale and priorities	Examples of scalable support	Decision window & sustainment
Cyclone prepositioning	Enable an initial response within 72 hours despite access constraints	Departmental hubs, Grand Sud and Grand Nord priority; IOM maintains six prepositioning points. Size to single-storm vulnerability, not to the seasonal forecast.	NFI and shelter stocks; anticipatory cash mechanisms; standby logistics agreements	Complete staging now — the season peak is inside the primary horizon. Hold stocks distributed and accessible through October.
Vaccine-preventable disease response	Close the immunity gap before an importation event, and hold diphtheria case fatality down	Approximately eight susceptible measles birth cohorts since the 2019 campaign [11]; an active diphtheria outbreak — 159 confirmed cases and five deaths through May, with cases in Ouest and Artibonite displacement sites — against a global antitoxin shortage [8][9][10]. Prioritise displacement sites and receiving communities.	Support to a measles follow-up or catch-up campaign; cold chain; diphtheria antitoxin and antibiotic supply; contact tracing; surveillance staffing	Initiate now. Antitoxin and campaign lead times exceed the primary horizon.
Cholera readiness	Hold case fatality below 1% if resurgence accelerates	CTC/CTU capacity and chlorine in Ouest and Artibonite; maintain case-area targeted intervention capability [10].	Treatment kits; CATI teams; WASH surge; support assessment and, where criteria are met, an ICG request for OCV	Stage within four weeks; sustain through the rainy season.
Therapeutic nutrition pipeline	Prevent child mortality from severe acute malnutrition	Approximately 125,000 children in the national SAM caseload; maintain continuity from procurement through outpatient and stabilisation services.	RUTF procurement or funding; OTP and stabilisation-centre staffing; last-mile support	Commit immediately; verify supplier, freight and customs lead times and maintain the pipeline through Q4.
Electoral displacement contingency — re-dated	Provide immediate support for new displacement without service collapse	Re-date staging from August to the October–December registration, campaign and polling sequence. Metropolitan Port-au-Prince and likely receiving areas; protection and GBV surge capacity remain critical.	NFI and hot-meal capacity; protection staffing; GBV services; site management support	Hold capacity through the interim; activate before the campaign period opens on 5 October.
GBV prevention and response — new this issue	Meet a caseload rising faster than any other measured Haitian indicator	More than 3,000 incidents recorded April–June 2026 and 5,500 in the first half of the year, against just over 8,000 in all of the previous year [2]. Prioritise displacement sites and receiving communities in the metropolitan area.	GBV case management; clinical management of rape and post-rape kits; safe spaces; specialised staffing; referral pathways	Immediate. The fastest-deteriorating measured indicator in this assessment.
Returnee reception	Restore documentation and basic services for	More than 140,000 forced returns January–June 2026, many arriving without documents or resources	Civil-documentation support; rights information; psychosocial support; onward	Ongoing; scale with observed return

Priority capability	Required operational effect	Operational scale and priorities	Examples of scalable support	Decision window & sustainment
	forced returnees	[2].	transport and reception	volumes.

Recommended readiness actions

- **Re-date, do not release, electoral contingency capacity.** The trigger moved from 30 August to 13 December, with the campaign opening 5 October and registration closing 13 October. Stocks and staffing plans built for August retain their value.
- **Treat the eight accumulated measles birth cohorts as the priority preventive investment.** A campaign requires lead time that exceeds this issue's horizon; starting in August is the difference between prevention and outbreak response.
- **Add diphtheria to cholera-readiness planning rather than treating it separately.** The same displacement sites, the same surveillance staff and the same case-management capacity are involved. With WHO reporting a global antitoxin shortage, securing antitoxin has the longest and least controllable lead time of anything in the Haiti pipeline.
- **Move GBV response up the priority order.** On the available figures it is deteriorating faster than food security or displacement, and it is the sector where reporting most reliably understates the true caseload.
- **Size hurricane posture to Haiti's vulnerability, not the seasonal forecast.** The Atlantic forecast has been revised downward twice since April (§3.5). That is not a reason to reduce staging; Melissa remains the governing precedent.
- **Protect the RUTF and cholera-supply pipelines first.** Longest lead times, least tolerance for funding interruption.
- **Do not draw down Haiti-dedicated capacity toward Venezuela, Cuba or Colombia.** Four responses now compete for the same regional surge resources, and Haiti's funding position leaves no buffer.

Indicators and decision triggers

Indicator	Decision trigger and action
Any published change to the 27 July electoral calendar (CEP or government)	Re-date contingency posture; resolves KJ-9
Voter-registration coverage reporting for metropolitan Port-au-Prince (CEP/ONI)	Materially incomplete coverage in armed-group-controlled areas: raise the probability of a contested process and of post-announcement unrest
NHC advisory or associated hazard product indicating potential tropical-storm-force winds, damaging rainfall or storm surge affecting Hispaniola	Issue a Flash Bulletin at the first material indication; set staging deadlines against NHC's earliest reasonable arrival time of tropical-storm-force winds, not cone contact
Weekly suspected cholera cases (MSPP/PAHO) rising for three consecutive weeks	Activate cholera surge posture; support assessment and, where criteria are met, an ICG request for OCV
Laboratory-confirmed diphtheria cases in displacement sites rising above the 2026 baseline	Escalate antitoxin sourcing and contact tracing; integrate with cholera surge capacity
Any laboratory-confirmed measles case in Haiti	Treat as an outbreak-initiating event given accumulated susceptibility; activate outbreak-response immunization
Quarterly GBV incident totals (OCHA / protection cluster)	Continued quarter-on-quarter rise: escalate GBV response ahead of other sectors; verify post-rape kit and clinical-management coverage in displacement sites
Next IPC publication	Re-baseline food-security assessment; reassess Haiti severity and Phase 4 caseloads
Armed-group expansion into new departments (OCHA/DTM)	Reassess access corridors and prepositioning-hub placement

Sources: [1] IPC, Haiti Acute Food Security Situation Projection Update, March–June 2026 — ipcinfo.org. [2] OCHA briefing on Haiti displacement and forced returns, 29 Jul 2026 — unocha.org. [3] OCHA Haiti country page and 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan — unocha.org. [4] Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2026: Haiti — freedomhouse.org. [5] Conseil Électoral Provisoire, Note de presse CEP/DC/028-2526, 'Publication officielle du calendrier électoral 2026-2027', with signed 28-step calendar table, 27 Jul 2026 — cephaiti.ht. [6] Reuters, 'Haiti electoral council schedules long-delayed presidential vote for December', 27 Jul 2026 — reuters.com. [7] The Haitian Times, 'Haiti sets Dec. 13 date for first national election in a decade', 28 Jul 2026

— haitiantimes.com. [8] PAHO, Epidemiological Alert: Diphtheria in the Americas Region, 11 Jun 2026, and PAHO news release, 15 Jun 2026 — paho.org. [9] PAHO, 'PAHO responds to Haiti's humanitarian crisis Grade 3' (displacement-site diphtheria cases; health-facility functionality; cholera) — paho.org. [10] WHO, Disease Outbreak News and rapid risk assessment on diphtheria, noting the global antitoxin shortage — who.int. [11] PAHO, Regional Situation Report No. 7, Measles in the Region of the Americas, 17 Jul 2026 — paho.org. [12] BINUH/OHCHR quarterly reporting on human rights and gang violence, and UN Security Council Report, Haiti Monthly Forecast, 1 Jul 2026 — binuh.unmissions.org, securitycouncilreport.org. [13] OCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2026, and Haiti 2026 HNRP Executive Summary (Melissa impact) — unocha.org.

3.3 Central American Dry Corridor — Lean Season & Postrera Window — PACMO-2026-CAM-003

Field	Assessment
Status	Active — lean-season peak; the pre-planting anticipatory window is now closing
Hazard type	Drought / food insecurity (slow-onset), El Niño-driven
Operating area	Dry Corridor of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua; sharpest in central Honduras (Yoro, El Paraíso, Olancho) and the north–south dry belt extending into Nicaragua, the Eastern Dry Corridor of El Salvador, and the Guatemalan corredor seco (Zacapa, Chiquimula, Jutiapa, El Progreso) and Western Altiplano [1][2]
Probability	Below-average smallholder primera harvest: likely (55–80%) — KJ-2, resolving 30 September
Confidence	Moderate — adopting FEWS NET most-likely scenarios
Caseload / exposure	FEWS NET estimates 500,000–749,999 people in Honduras requiring humanitarian food assistance, with needs peaking June–August and declining from September as primera harvests arrive [1]. Country-level figures elsewhere should be taken from current national FEWS NET and IPC products
Severity assessment	Current regional severity: Tier 3. Unchanged. Rationale: geographically dispersed, slow-onset needs across several countries whose national systems remain partly functional, but current assistance is insufficient to prevent expanding Crisis-level food insecurity. Country-level severity varies. Tier 4 escalation potential if the postrera also fails and response gaps widen.
Sustainment outlook	Lean-season peak Jun–Sep 2026; postrera planting Aug–Sep and harvest Nov–Dec set the trajectory into 2027

Operational environment

The Dry Corridor picture is broadly as Issue No. 1 projected, with one materially favourable change and one unchanged fundamental. FEWS NET's June outlook for Honduras records below-average and erratically distributed rainfall with above-average temperatures persisting through June, cumulative deficits of approximately 45 mm across parts of Yoro, El Paraíso and Olancho, and a pronounced north–south dry belt through central Honduras into Nicaragua — anomalies FEWS NET attributes to the El Niño conditions that emerged in June [1]. Poor rural households across the corridor are already in Crisis, with stocks depleted atypically early, and delayed primera planting has suppressed demand for agricultural labour, a primary income source [1][2].

The favourable change is input costs. Issue No. 1 identified elevated fuel and fertiliser prices as a compounding driver reducing input use and therefore yields. FEWS NET's 31 July Price Watch records that crude oil and fertiliser prices fell sharply after the Strait of Hormuz reopened in mid-June, with Brent at US\$85/bbl and urea driving a broad fertiliser price decline [3]. Staple prices themselves remain mixed and elevated: white maize was stable against May but above average in El Salvador and Honduras, while red and black beans were below average in El Salvador and Guatemala and above average in Honduras on tighter domestic supply [3]. The practical implication is specific: an input-support or voucher package for postrera planting costs less per household in August than the same package would have cost in May, while the rainfall deficit that makes it necessary has not eased. PACMO assesses this as the best value-for-money window in this issue.

National systems have moved on anticipatory action. Honduras's CENAOS issued region-specific planting guidance, and SAG advised some farmers to prioritise red beans over white maize because of the shorter cycle and lower water requirement [4]. In Guatemala, MAGA is running anticipatory measures including rainwater reservoirs in Jutiapa, Jalapa and Chiquimula and drought monitoring across its municipal network, while CONRED reporting on wildfire suppression during 2026 underlines that water stress and fire risk arrive together [5]. Reported figures of 2.0–2.4 million people in Guatemala requiring food assistance during June–August, and a UN programme of approximately US\$60 million targeting 700,000 people across 38 municipalities from 1 June, come from secondary compilation rather than a primary FEWS NET or IPC document reviewed by PACMO; they are reported here at low confidence and should be verified against current national products before use in planning [5]. The FAO–WFP joint El Niño anticipatory-action appeal (June 2026–March 2027) remains the primary coordination vehicle [6].

30/90-day operational outlook and the closing window

The analytic structure is unchanged from Issue No. 1 and the clock has advanced. A below-average primera is recoverable; a failed postrera converts this into a Tier 4 multi-country event running into 2027. The postrera planting window is August–

September, which means the highest-leverage intervention in this issue must be funded and delivered inside the 30-day primary horizon. PACMO continues to assess it is likely (55–80%) that anticipatory cash and livelihood support delivered before postrera planting will be substantially more cost-effective than post-harvest emergency response.

One forward risk deserves separate flagging. An extended canícula during maize tasseling is the specific mechanism by which a marginal season becomes a failed one for corredor seco subsistence households [5]. Under a strengthening El Niño (§3.4), the July–August canícula is the variable most worth watching, and it is observable in near-real time through national agrometeorological monitoring rather than requiring the next seasonal outlook.

Critical capability requirements

Country programmes should use current national assessments, market data, admission trends and planting calendars to set caseloads, transfer values and procurement quantities.

Priority capability	Required operational effect	Operational scale and priorities	Examples of scalable support	Decision window & sustainment
Postrera planting support	Protect the second harvest — the season that determines 2027	Drought-tolerant and short-cycle seed (red bean over white maize where national guidance so advises) and inputs, per smallholder census in deficit municipalities [4].	Seed systems; input vouchers; extension support aligned to CENAOS/MAGA guidance	Complete distribution before the Aug–Sep planting window. This is the shortest-fuse action in this issue.
Anticipatory cash	Prevent negative coping before the lean-season trough	Target households projected to deteriorate from IPC Phase 2 to Phase 3 in deficit municipalities; set transfer values using current market and minimum-expenditure-basket analysis, noting that bean prices diverge sharply between Honduras and its neighbours [3].	CVA funding or delivery; targeting support; national safety-net top-ups	Deliver before September postrera planting; the pre-planting window narrows sharply after planting.
Therapeutic nutrition prepositioning	Prevent under-five mortality as admissions rise through the lean season	Country-specific under-five SAM caseloads based on current national nutrition surveys, verified admissions and programme coverage gaps.	RUTF procurement; CMAM/OTP capacity	Initiate procurement and capacity checks now; verify supplier and in-country lead times against expected admission rises.
Water access	Sustain household and productive water through deficit months	Prioritise deficit municipalities where access is already deteriorating; favour rehabilitation, harvesting and local supply restoration over routine trucking. Guatemalan municipal systems face simultaneous water-rationing and wildfire pressure [5].	Water-point rehabilitation; harvesting and catchment; targeted trucking	Begin immediately where deficits affect access; sustain through the lean-season and planting windows.

Recommended readiness actions

- **Buy inputs now.** Fertiliser prices have fallen since the May–June peak while the rainfall deficit has not eased. The same budget buys more coverage in August than it did in May, and less in October than in August.
- **Align seed selection with national guidance rather than default packages.** Honduran authorities are steering smallholders toward short-cycle red beans specifically because of the water profile; imported standard maize packages work against that.
- **Watch the canícula, not just the seasonal outlook.** An extended mid-season dry spell during tasseling is the failure mechanism, and it is observable weeks before harvest data.
- **Verify the Guatemala caseload figures against primary products.** The widely circulated 2.0–2.4 million and 700,000-person programme figures could not be traced by PACMO to a primary FEWS NET, IPC or UN document. Do not use them as planning anchors without verification.

- **Align with the FAO–WFP joint anticipatory appeal** to avoid duplication in the same municipalities.

Indicators and decision triggers

Indicator	Decision trigger and action
Next FEWS NET and IPC Dry Corridor updates	Re-baseline Phase 3 populations; reassess country-level and regional severity; resolves KJ-2 on 30 September
Canícula duration and timing during maize tasseling (national agrometeorological monitoring)	Extended canícula in corredor seco departments: raise the probability of primera failure and accelerate postrera input delivery
Postrera planting-window rainfall (Aug–Sep)	Deficits sufficient to materially delay or reduce postrera planting, as identified by FEWS NET or national monitoring: reassess whether Tier 4 regional severity criteria are met
Fertiliser and fuel price direction (FEWS NET Price Watch)	Renewed increase: revisit input-support transfer values and accelerate procurement before further rises
National red-alert declarations (e.g. COPECO Honduras, CONRED Guatemala)	Align with national systems; scale cash delivery
Regional staple prices (maize/beans) vs. five-year average	Sustained >30% above average: purchasing-power alarm; revisit transfer values

Sources: [1] FEWS NET, Honduras Food Security Outlook, Jun 2026 — [fews.net](#). [2] FEWS NET, El Salvador Food Security Outlook Update, Apr 2026 — [fews.net](#). [3] FEWS NET, Global Price Watch, 31 Jul 2026 — [fews.net](#). [4] FEWS NET, Honduras Key Message Update, May 2026 (CENAOS and SAG planting guidance) — [fews.net](#). [5] Secondary compilation of FEWS NET, MAGA and CONRED reporting on Guatemala, Jun 2026 — reported at low confidence; verify against primary products. [6] FAO and WFP, joint El Niño anticipatory action appeal, Jun 2026–Mar 2027 — [fao.org](#).

3.4 El Niño 2026–27 Hemispheric Impacts — PACMO-2026-REG-004

Field	Assessment
Status	Watch — climate driver strengthening; impacts now arriving inside the assessment horizon rather than beyond it
Hazard type	Climate driver (composite): drives drought, flood, fire and cyclone-pattern risks across the hemisphere
Operating area	Hemispheric. Drying: Central America, northern South America (including Colombia and Venezuela), the Caribbean, the Amazon Basin and the Andean plateau. Wetting/flood: south-eastern South America and the Ecuadorian and northern Peruvian coast
Probability	Persistence through DJF 2026–27: very likely (80–95%). CPC categorisation of strong or greater at peak: very likely (80–95%). Categorisation as very strong: very likely (80–95%) — KJ-10
Confidence	High on persistence; moderate to high on peak magnitude
Caseload / exposure	No standalone caseload; impacts are expressed through §3.1, §3.2, §3.3, §3.5, §3.8 and §3.9
Severity assessment	Not independently tiered. El Niño is a cross-cutting climate driver; severity is expressed through the affected crisis entries and any realised drought, flood, fire or cyclone events.
Sustainment outlook	Peak expected Oct–Dec 2026; impacts run through Q1 2027 and, for Amazon fire and hydrology, potentially into the second half of 2027

What changed, and why it matters more than last month

In Issue No. 1 this entry was a watch on a developing driver with a 3–6 month lead time. It is now the strongest single signal in the issue. CPC upgraded from an El Niño Watch to an El Niño Advisory on 11 June. In its 9 July diagnostic discussion, CPC reports that El Niño strengthened over the past month, with a large area of sea-surface temperature anomalies in excess of +1.0 °C across the central and eastern equatorial Pacific; the latest weekly Niño-3.4 index value was +1.2 °C, with Niño-4 at +0.5 °C and Niño-1+2 at +2.7 °C. A recent downwelling Kelvin wave deepened the thermocline and raised temperatures in the eastern Pacific, and the traditional and equatorial Southern Oscillation indices were significantly negative [1].

CPC states that the NMME average, including CFSv2, forecasts El Niño to intensify through 2026, and that strong coupling of the atmospheric and oceanic circulation across the Pacific contributes to very high confidence that El Niño will continue through early 2027, with a 97 per cent chance it persists through early spring 2027. In the same discussion CPC publishes an 81 per cent chance of a very strong El Niño during October–December, an event that would rank among the largest in the record going back to 1950 [1]. IRI's July Quick Look reports that the mid-July CCSR/IRI model ensemble overwhelmingly supports the development of a strong El Niño, with every model maintaining El Niño conditions throughout the forecast period; the event is projected to peak during October–December 2026, when 23 of 26 models forecast a very strong El Niño (Niño-3.4 $\geq$ +2.0 °C). IRI describes the forecast signal as clear, consistent and supported by exceptional model agreement [2].

Two technical points affect how this judgment should be read. First, CPC's 2026 discussions express Niño-region anomalies using the Relative Oceanic Niño Index (RONI) — Niño-3.4 minus the tropical mean, rescaled so the variance equals the original index — rather than the traditional ONI, so a raw traditional-ONI value should not be compared directly against the figures above. KJ-10 is therefore written against CPC's own published strength categorisation and its RONI-based strength-probability product rather than against a numeric threshold PACMO selects; this is the criterion-design lesson drawn from KJ-5 in Section 5. Second, the large Niño-1+2 anomaly relative to Niño-3.4 is an eastern-Pacific-leaning signature, which historically favours coastal Peru and Ecuador rainfall impacts together with dryness over the Amazon Basin and northern South America — the specific pattern underlying §3.8 and the drying assessments in §3.1 and §3.9.

PACMO registers KJ-10 rather than revising KJ-3b, in line with the rule that published probability bands are not edited after the fact. The substantive point is that the distribution has shifted upward twice in two months: what Issue No. 1 treated as an uncertainty about whether the event would reach moderate strength is now an uncertainty about how far past strong it goes. KJ-10b is set at very likely (80–95%) to contain CPC's published 81 per cent rather than to depart from it. Where an authoritative forecaster publishes a probability for precisely the outcome PACMO is assessing, PACMO adopts it unless it has a stated reason to differ; PACMO has none here, and both the CPC and IRI language has moved from hedged to confident.

The operational consequence is that El Niño has stopped being a forecast and started being a scheduling constraint. It is the common cause behind four separate assessments in this issue — the Dry Corridor deficit (§3.3), the suppressed Atlantic and amplified Eastern Pacific seasons (§3.5), the Amazon vazante and fire season (§3.8), and drying risk across Colombia and Venezuela (§3.1, §3.9). Prepositioning decisions taken for one of these are correlated with the others; organisations that plan them as independent risks will under-provision for the case where several arrive together, which is precisely the case the driver makes more likely.

Two sub-signals deserve separate attention. First, the Niño-1+2 anomaly of +2.7 °C in early July points to a coastal El Niño off Peru and Ecuador, which Peru's ENFEN has been tracking under a coastal alert; the associated impact is intense coastal rainfall and flooding, typically peaking December–March — outside this issue's horizon, but with a preparation window that is inside it [3]. Second, the wetting phase over south-eastern South America raises riverine flood risk in the Paraná and Uruguay basins into the austral spring and summer. Both are carried on the Watch List with named escalation triggers.

Recommended readiness actions

- **Plan the four El Niño-linked exposures as a correlated set.** One driver is raising several risks at once. Coordinated prepositioning across the Dry Corridor, the Amazon, the Eastern Pacific coast and northern South America is more efficient than four siloed contingency plans, and better matched to the actual risk structure.
- **Open the Peru/Ecuador coastal flood preparation window now.** The impact is a December–March problem; contingency stock placement, shelter agreements and early-warning arrangements are an August–October problem.
- **Factor northern South American drying into Venezuela water planning (§3.1) and into Colombian rural water and food-security planning (§3.9).**
- **Track the 13 August CPC ENSO Diagnostic Discussion, the NOAA Atlantic outlook update due in early August and the 5 August CSU update** as this quarter's scheduled confidence-revision points. All three fall inside the 30-day primary horizon.

Sources: [1] NOAA CPC, ENSO Diagnostic Discussion, 9 Jul 2026, and CPC Official ENSO Strength Probabilities and RONI historical episode table — cpc.ncep.noaa.gov. [2] IRI, ENSO Quick Look, Jul 2026 — iri.columbia.edu. [3] OTCA summary of ENFEN, CIIFEN and NOAA bulletins on El Niño risk in the Amazon and the Pacific coast, 2026 — otca.org. [4] NOAA CPC, ENSO Diagnostic Discussion, 11 Jun 2026 (transition to El Niño Advisory) — cpc.ncep.noaa.gov. [5] FAO, El Niño cross-hazard risk mapping, Jun 2026 — fao.org.

3.5 2026 Atlantic & Eastern Pacific Cyclone Seasons — PACMO-2026-REG-005

Field	Assessment
Status	Advisory — Atlantic entering its historically active phase in a strongly suppressed state; Eastern Pacific already running ahead of pace
Hazard type	Tropical cyclone
Operating area	Atlantic basin (Caribbean, Gulf, US/Mexican/Central American coasts); Eastern Pacific (Mexican Pacific coast, Central America)
Probability	Below-normal Atlantic season total: likely (55–80%) — KJ-4. Above-normal Eastern Pacific season: likely (55–80%)
Confidence	Moderate to high on seasonal totals; individual landfalls are not seasonally forecastable at any confidence
Caseload / exposure	Conditional. One Atlantic named storm has formed to date — Tropical Storm Arthur, which made landfall near Freeport, Texas, on 17 June — against a July seasonal forecast of nine. PACMO does not publish a live basin storm count and directs readers to NHC products for current status [1]
Severity assessment	Not currently tiered. Conditional landfall scenarios are assessed below against country-specific exposure and residual capacity.
Sustainment outlook	Both seasons to 30 November; Atlantic peak mid-August through October

The asymmetry has sharpened

Issue No. 1 warned against the ‘below-normal trap.’ A month later the Atlantic forecast has been cut again and the warning is more, not less, necessary. Colorado State University has lowered its outlook twice since April: from 13 named storms, 6 hurricanes and 2 major hurricanes in the 9 April forecast, to 11/5/2 on 10 June, to 9 named storms, 4 hurricanes and 1 major hurricane on 8 July, with net tropical cyclone activity at approximately 40–45 per cent of long-term averages. The 1991–2020 averages are 14 named storms, 7 hurricanes and 3 major hurricanes. CSU attributes the reduction explicitly to increased confidence in a strong or very strong El Niño at the season peak, and notes Caribbean wind shear running at the second-highest level on record for early July [2][3]. NOAA’s May outlook (8–14 named storms, 3–6 hurricanes, 1–3 major hurricanes, 55 per cent chance of a below-normal season) remains the official position at publication; the CPC update is due in early August [4].

Atlantic activity to date is consistent with suppression. Tropical Storm Arthur formed off the Texas coast in mid-June and made landfall near Freeport on 17 June, unusually derived in part from the remnants of Eastern Pacific Tropical Storm Cristina, which crossed Central America and reorganised over the Gulf — a rare Pacific-to-Atlantic crossover [5].

The Eastern Pacific is the mirror image and is where the realised humanitarian impact has occurred so far. NOAA’s May outlook gives a 70 per cent chance of an above-normal season, with 15–22 named storms, 9–14 hurricanes and 5–9 major hurricanes [6]. The season opened with the most active first week since 1985: Tropical Storm Amanda (2 June); Tropical Storm Boris (7 June), which made landfall on Mexico’s southern coast with four deaths and damage estimated at at least US\$81 million; and Tropical Storm Cristina (8 June), whose flooding rains killed at least six people across Guatemala and Chiapas [6][7]. Tropical Storm Douglas followed on 1 July without threatening land, and further development followed in mid-July [7]. Two people have already died in the Dry Corridor countries this season from an Eastern Pacific system — a point worth holding alongside \$3.3, because flood damage to standing crops in a deficit year compounds rather than offsets drought.

The posture consequence is asymmetric and specific. Caribbean posture should not be reduced: a below-normal forecast constrains the number of storms, not the intensity of any one of them. The 2025 season produced 13 named storms and 5 hurricanes — below the 1991–2020 averages of 14 and 7 — yet four major hurricanes, three of which reached Category 5 (Erin, Humberto and Melissa), and CSU classified the season overall as above-normal. Melissa caused a major humanitarian emergency in Jamaica, Haiti and Cuba [8]. Seasonal storm counts are the wrong variable for sizing posture. Central American and Mexican Pacific posture should be raised, because the forecast, the observed season pace and the realised impacts all point the same way. Issue No. 1 asked for symmetric attention to the Eastern Pacific; this issue upgrades that to an explicit recommendation to shift marginal readiness investment toward the Pacific coast.

The compounding factor that did not exist in Issue No. 1 is Cuba (\$3.7). A Cuban landfall this season would strike a country whose evacuation logistics, water pumping, refrigeration and communications all depend on electricity and diesel it does not currently have. PACMO assesses the conditional severity of a Cuba landfall as materially higher this season than the Cuban civil-defence system's strong historical performance would suggest.

Landfall planning scenarios

Scenario	Conditional severity assessment	Staging implication
Cat 3+ landfall, Hispaniola (Haiti / Dominican Republic)	Illustrative Tier 4 for a major Haiti impact; Dominican Republic severity requires a separate assessment against national and subnational capacity.	Stage NFI and shelter at Grand Sud and Grand Nord nodes before peak; complete time-sensitive actions before NHC's earliest reasonable arrival time of tropical-storm-force winds
Any hurricane landfall, Cuba — new this issue	Illustrative Tier 4–5. Rationale: the national response system's dependence on fuel and grid power is currently the binding constraint (\$3.7); evacuation, pumping, refrigeration and communications would be degraded before the storm arrives.	Pre-agree fuel and generator support, water-treatment and pumping capacity, and communications redundancy now, not at advisory time
Cat 3+ landfall, Central American Caribbean coast	Illustrative Tier 3; final severity varies by country, impact corridor, access and residual capacity.	Swiftwater rescue and roof-repair capability; access-corridor clearance capacity
Eastern Pacific major hurricane, Mexican / Central American Pacific coast	Illustrative Tier 2–3; final severity varies by country, infrastructure disruption, access and residual capacity. Probability raised this issue on the above-normal forecast and observed season pace.	Apply the same monitoring and readiness criteria to NHC Eastern Pacific advisories as to Atlantic ones; note the compounding effect of flood damage on already-deficient Dry Corridor harvests

Recommended readiness actions

- **Do not stand down Caribbean posture on the revised forecast.** The Atlantic forecast has fallen twice since April. Haiti, Cuba and eastern Caribbean single-storm exposure has not changed at all.
- **Shift marginal readiness investment toward the Eastern Pacific.** The forecast, the season pace and the realised June impacts all point the same direction, and Central America's Pacific slope is already under food-security stress.
- **Build a Cuba landfall annex into Caribbean contingency plans.** Assume degraded national logistics rather than the historically strong Cuban civil-defence baseline.
- **PACMO standing escalation trigger:** issue a Flash Bulletin at the first material indication in NHC advisories or associated hazard products of significant impacts to populated land in the coverage area; use NHC's earliest reasonable arrival time of tropical-storm-force winds as the operational clock for time-sensitive preparations.

Sources: [1] NOAA National Hurricane Center, Atlantic and Eastern Pacific Tropical Weather Outlooks and Tropical Cyclone Reports, accessed 1–2 Aug 2026 — nhc.noaa.gov. [2] Colorado State University, Forecast of Atlantic Seasonal Hurricane Activity, 9 Apr, 10 Jun and 8 Jul 2026 — tropical.colostate.edu. [3] Coverage of the CSU July update and Caribbean shear anomaly, 8 Jul 2026. [4] NOAA, 'NOAA predicts below-normal 2026 Atlantic hurricane season', 21 May 2026, and NOAA CPC Atlantic Hurricane Season Outlook — noaa.gov, cpc.ncep.noaa.gov. [5] NHC Tropical Cyclone Report, Tropical Storm Arthur, and contemporary reporting, Jun 2026 — nhc.noaa.gov. [6] NOAA, 2026 Eastern Pacific Hurricane Season Outlook, 21 May 2026 — noaa.gov. [7] NHC advisories and Tropical Cyclone Reports for Eastern Pacific storms Amanda, Boris, Cristina and Douglas, Jun–Jul 2026 — nhc.noaa.gov. [8] NOAA, '2025 Atlantic hurricane season marked by striking contrasts', 25 Nov 2025 — noaa.gov; and CSU 2025 seasonal verification — tropical.colostate.edu.

3.6 Measles Multi-Country Outbreak — PACMO-2026-REG-006

Field	Assessment
Status	Active — sustained regional transmission, currently declining in the largest affected countries
Hazard type	Epidemic (vaccine-preventable)
Operating area	17 countries and territories with confirmed cases in 2026; community transmission in Guatemala, Mexico and Bolivia; active outbreaks also in the United States, Canada and Peru [1]
Probability	Full-year 2026 total of at least 25,000 confirmed cases: threshold already exceeded on the currently published regional total — see KJ-5 in Section 5, including an important caveat on comparability
Confidence	High on case counts as published; moderate on trend interpretation because of a mid-year change in Guatemala's reporting basis
Caseload / exposure	43,559 confirmed cases and 44 deaths (CFR 0.10%) across 17 countries and territories, EW 1–27 2026 (to 11 July) — a 3.8-fold increase on the same period in 2025. Guatemala (27,145), Mexico (12,052), the United States (2,231) and Canada (1,097) account for 98 per cent of cases [1]
Severity assessment	Current regional severity: Tier 2 — sustained multi-country transmission requiring targeted public-health support, with national response systems broadly functional. Guatemala country-level: Tier 3 — transmission in all 22 departments, 26 deaths, and vaccination campaign coverage running well behind plan. Local severity is also higher in low-coverage, displaced and indigenous communities elsewhere.
Sustainment outlook	Ongoing. Amplification risk through mass gatherings and travel corridors, and a specific importation risk into Venezuelan displacement sites

Operational environment — and a data-integrity warning

The regional cumulative total rose from 22,974 confirmed cases at EW 25 to 43,559 at EW 27. That jump is overwhelmingly an artefact of reporting-basis change, not transmission. Guatemala's reported total increased from 7,067 to 27,145 — an addition of 20,078 cases — after the country retrospectively included cases confirmed by epidemiological linkage and clinical criteria alongside laboratory-confirmed cases. The change reverses the effect of Guatemala's Ministry of Health protocol issued on 16 March 2026, under which laboratory samples were no longer collected for epidemiologically linked or clinically confirmed cases and reported figures therefore contained laboratory-confirmed cases only [1][2]. Of Guatemala's 27,145 confirmed cases, 7,489 are laboratory-confirmed, 3,054 epidemiologically linked and 16,602 confirmed on clinical criteria [1]. PAHO states explicitly that this change should be considered when interpreting regional totals and trends, and has suspended transmission modelling for Guatemala because the case-definition change breaks series comparability [1].

Reconciliation note. PAHO restated prior-period weekly figures in the same revision that added Guatemala's clinically and epidemiologically confirmed cases. The two-week comparison reported below is therefore against restated figures and cannot be reconstructed from the totals published in Situation Report No. 6, which gave 479 new confirmed cases for EW 23–24 against 980 for EW 21–22. Readers re-baselining their own planning figures should take both the level and the comparison period from Situation Report No. 7 or later, and should not mix the two series.

PACMO flags this prominently because it is the kind of change that silently corrupts downstream planning. Any organisation that set a 2026 measles planning figure from the June regional total and re-reads the July total will conclude that transmission roughly doubled in two weeks. It did not. Underlying transmission is declining. On the restated series, the region reported 1,818 new confirmed cases in EW 25–26, a 38.4 per cent decrease on the preceding two-week period, with declines in Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and the United States, partly offset by an increase in Canada driven by Quebec [1]. PAHO's modelled effective reproduction numbers are below one in every country where estimation is reliable: Mexico 0.66 (95% CrI 0.59–0.73), the United States 0.72 (0.59–0.87) and Peru 0.77 (0.68–0.87), with four-week forecasts of roughly 150, 61 and 149 further cases respectively [1]. Mortality has continued to accrue: five further deaths in EW 25–26, four in Guatemala and one in Mexico.

Three operational gaps stand out from PAHO's reporting, and each maps to a different assessment in this issue. Guatemala's campaign is behind schedule: in Guatemala Central, 365,785 doses had been administered after seven weeks, representing 54.4 per cent progress against an expected 87 per cent; in the Northwestern region, 41,996 doses after three weeks represented 21 per cent against an expected 45 per cent [1]. Haiti is the region's largest latent risk:

classified high risk, with the last campaign conducted in 2019 and approximately eight susceptible birth cohorts accumulated (§3.2) [1]. Honduras did not implement its planned 2025 campaign, and the vaccine formulation and strategy remain under discussion — in a country that is also a Dry Corridor caseload (§3.3) [1].

For Venezuela, PAHO states that the risk of measles introduction and spread remains a concern following the earthquakes, citing suboptimal vaccination coverage, surveillance gaps and the gathering of displaced populations in temporary camps, including in areas receiving humanitarian personnel; it has developed a protocol to guide vaccination in temporary shelters [1]. PACMO treats this as the highest-consequence low-probability interaction in this issue: a measles introduction into the La Guaira camp population would arrive in a setting with degraded health capacity, crowded shelter and an active waterborne-disease risk.

Regionally, PAHO has published a Multi-Country Measles Outbreak Response Strategy and Donor Appeal, is integrating measles vaccination into Mexico's FIFA World Cup public-health campaign, and has scheduled an outbreak-response review workshop in Mexico for 5–7 August [1][3]. Laboratory strengthening continues across the eastern Caribbean through PAHO, CARPHA and the Best-dos Santos laboratory [1].

Recommended readiness actions

- **Re-baseline any measles planning figure set before mid-July.** Use PAHO Situation Report No. 7 (17 July 2026) or later, and record which case definition underlies the figure. Comparisons across the Guatemala reporting change are invalid.
- **Verify vaccination coverage in any population your organisation shelters or serves** under the other assessments in this issue. Displacement concentrations in Venezuela, Haiti and Colombia are the amplification points.
- **Support Guatemala's campaign logistics rather than only its surveillance.** The gap is in dose delivery against plan, concentrated in Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Ixil, Huehuetenango and Chiquimula, and it needs microplanning, transport and community engagement in Mayan languages.
- **Treat Haiti and Honduras as pre-outbreak, not post-outbreak, problems.** Both have known, quantified immunity gaps and no completed recent campaign. Preventive investment now is an order of magnitude cheaper than outbreak response later.
- **Integrate vaccination into Venezuelan camp operations** using PAHO's shelter protocol, and include humanitarian personnel in immunity verification.

Indicators and decision triggers

Indicator	Decision trigger and action
PAHO regional situation reports (No. 7 issued 17 July; next report expected late July / early August, fortnightly thereafter)	Re-baseline; check for further case-definition changes and prior-period restatements before comparing periods
Modelled Rt rising above 1 in any country with community transmission	Reassess country severity tier; escalate campaign support
Any confirmed measles case in Venezuela or Haiti	Treat as outbreak-initiating given displacement concentration and accumulated susceptibility; activate outbreak-response immunization
Guatemala campaign progress against expected coverage	Sustained shortfall: prioritise logistics, transport and microplanning support over additional surveillance investment
Honduras campaign decision on formulation and strategy	Decision taken: support implementation immediately. Further delay: raise Honduras risk classification in planning

Sources: [1] PAHO/WHO, Regional Situation Report No. 7, Measles in the Region of the Americas, 17 July 2026 (reporting period EW 1–27 2026) — paho.org. [2] Guatemala Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social, Protocolo Operativo Sectorial de Respuesta a Sarampión V3, 16 Mar 2026 — saludjuntos.gt. [3] PAHO, Measles Multi-Country Outbreak 2026 topic page and Response Strategy and Donor Appeal — paho.org. [4] PAHO, Situation Report No. 6, 2 July 2026 — paho.org. [5] PAHO, measles epidemiological alerts, 3 Feb and 29 May 2026 — paho.org.

3.7 Cuba Energy, Water and Health-Service Emergency — PACMO-2026-CUB-007

New assessment. This entry did not appear in Issue No. 1.

Field	Assessment
Status	Active — systemic service-delivery emergency, deteriorating
Hazard type	Complex: energy-system failure driving cascading water, health, food-preservation and sanitation failure; compounded by acute fuel scarcity and high cyclone exposure during the season peak
Operating area	Nationwide. Havana and Camagüey are the most-reported urban failure points; rural and eastern provinces are less visible in reporting and should not be assumed better served
Probability	Event realised and ongoing. At least one further national or multi-province grid collapse before 2 November 2026: very likely (80–95%) — KJ-13
Confidence	High on the energy and service-failure picture; moderate on humanitarian caseload, because Cuba does not publish an OCHA-coordinated humanitarian needs figure comparable to other entries in this issue
Caseload / exposure	Approximately 9.6 million people nationally. The UN reported in April that roughly 1 million Cubans depend on water trucking severely constrained by the lack of diesel; that more than 96,000 surgeries had been delayed, including approximately 11,000 for children; and that the national immunization programme had been delayed for thousands of infants [1]. Official Cuban figures indicate roughly 2.7 million people without regular access to potable water and close to 10 million receiving intermittent service [2]. WFP's Country Strategic Plan 2026–2030, approved in June, allocates US\$116 million and cites severe energy shortages affecting access, logistics and delivery of assistance, growing operational constraints and rising food insecurity [3][4]
Severity assessment	Current severity: Tier 4. Rationale: national capacity is overwhelmed across multiple sectors simultaneously — electricity, water, health service continuity, food preservation and waste management — with the failure of one system (generation) propagating into all the others, and with major logistics and service-continuity constraints. State institutions remain functional and directive, which is why this is assessed at Tier 4 rather than Tier 5. Tier 5 escalation potential exists on a hurricane landfall or a sustained multi-week national outage.
Sustainment outlook	Structural. The government acknowledges that announced generation additions of approximately 400 MW are inadequate against demand, against a July deficit that exceeded 2,300 MW [2]. Plan on a multi-year horizon, not a seasonal one

Why PACMO is adding this entry now

Cuba was not assessed in Issue No. 1. That was an error of prioritisation rather than of fact: the inaugural issue concentrated on the two events then absorbing regional surge capacity and treated slower-onset service-delivery failure as background. Three developments make that untenable for August. First, the electricity system is failing repeatedly and at increasing depth. The national grid has now suffered four total collapses in 2026 — two in March (5 and 16 March, the second lasting more than 29 hours) and two in July (6 and 10 July, the second arriving four days after the first). Unión Eléctrica recorded a deficit of 2,341 MW on 10 July and anticipated a shortfall of 2,380 MW at the end of the month, enough to cut power to roughly 74 per cent of the country, exceeding records set on 5 and 17 July [2][5][6]. On 10 July the system was generating roughly 935 MW against demand of about 3,100 MW — under a third of requirement — with more than 100 distributed generation plants offline for want of fuel [5]. Second, the causal chain from generation to humanitarian outcome is explicit and measurable: in Havana approximately 87 per cent of the water distribution system depends on electric pumping, so outages leave hundreds of thousands without water directly [2]. Third, the Atlantic season peak is six weeks away and Cuba's response system is itself fuel- and power-dependent (§3.5).

Operational environment

Cuban oil imports fell to effectively zero in January 2026, for the first time since 2015, after Venezuelan shipments ceased and planned Mexican exports were suspended; Russian shipments have continued but cover only a small share of consumption [5][7]. The resulting fuel scarcity has propagated through every service that depends on either electricity or diesel. Scheduled and unscheduled outages of many hours per day are routine nationally, with some Havana districts reporting interruptions beyond 30 hours and some rural communities beyond 70 hours [7][8].

The humanitarian consequences reported by the UN and operational partners are specific rather than general. Water delivery to roughly a million people depends on trucking that lacks diesel, against official figures showing around 2.7 million people without regular potable water access. More than 96,000 surgeries have been delayed, including approximately 11,000 paediatric cases, and the national immunization programme has been delayed for thousands of infants — a point that should be read alongside §3.6, because a delayed infant immunization programme is exactly how susceptible birth cohorts accumulate. Waste collection has failed in Havana, with fuel shortages leaving refuse in the streets, creating vector and enteric-disease conditions in a dense urban population. Households without refrigeration lose food stocks; partners report increased visible destitution, street begging and scavenging in the capital [1][2][9].

The response itself is fuel-constrained. In April the UN reported that 170 containers holding approximately US\$6.3 million of humanitarian supplies remained undelivered inside Cuba because of fuel shortages, with the Resident Coordinator stating the country had been without sufficient fuel for more than three months [10]. This is an unusual and important operational feature: in most Tier 4 environments the constraint is access or funding; in Cuba the binding constraint is the last mile, and it is energy. Supplies can enter the country and still not reach people.

Economic contraction underlies all of it. WFP records a 15 per cent contraction in GDP over six years; other assessments cite a contraction of roughly 23 per cent since 2019 [4][11]. PACMO reports both and treats neither as authoritative for planning; the operationally relevant fact is the direction and the absence of fiscal space to import fuel. The WFP Country Strategic Plan 2026–2030, approved in June with US\$116 million, and a European Union allocation of €2.85 million to WFP to assist more than 815,000 Cubans affected by Hurricane Melissa, are the principal identified funding vehicles [3][12]. Melissa's 2025 impact remains an unclosed recovery burden layered under the current crisis.

PACMO notes that responsibility for this crisis is contested and politically charged: the Cuban government attributes it to the United States embargo and to what it describes as an energy blockade, while the United States describes the pressure as intended to force political and economic opening [7][8]. PACMO takes no position on that dispute. The mechanism, as distinct from the responsibility, is documented and is stated above; the humanitarian consequences are observable independently of attribution, and posture recommendations follow from the consequences.

30/90-day operational outlook

Three exposures define the period. Continued grid failure is near-certain (KJ-13): four total collapses in 2026 to date, a structural deficit exceeding 2,300 MW against demand of roughly 3,100 MW, and acknowledged inadequacy of announced capacity additions. Water and enteric-disease risk rises through the wet and hot season, driven by pumping failure, interrupted trucking and failed waste collection rather than by any single infrastructure event; PAHO's February 2026 dengue update also records continuing dengue transmission in Cuba, and stagnant-water storage in response to supply failure is a classic vector amplifier [13]. Cyclone exposure is the tail risk that would convert this into a Tier 5 event. Cuban civil defence has an outstanding historical record on evacuation and preparedness, and PACMO is explicitly warning against relying on that record this season: evacuation transport, shelter lighting, water pumping, cold chain and communications all now sit downstream of a fuel and power supply that is failing under normal conditions.

Priority operational objective and supporting priorities

Priority operational objective: restore predictable last-mile delivery capability — fuel, generation and cold chain for water, health and food distribution — because in this operating environment last-mile energy, not commodity supply, is what converts assistance into service.

Supporting priorities: protect health-service continuity for surgery backlogs, dialysis and the infant immunization programme; sustain and, where possible, decouple water supply from grid dependence at priority points; pre-position hurricane response assuming degraded national logistics; maintain nutrition support for households that have lost refrigeration and purchasing power.

Critical capability requirements

Operational-scale descriptions identify the system-wide problem and useful contribution types. Cuba's binding constraint is energy for the last mile; commodity-only contributions will underperform.

Priority capability	Required operational effect	Operational scale and priorities	Examples of scalable support	Decision window & sustainment
Last-mile energy for service delivery	Make existing supplies deliverable	170 containers of humanitarian supplies were reported undelivered inside the country for	Fuel for humanitarian logistics; solar and generator capacity for pumping, cold	Immediate and continuous. This is the single highest-value

Priority capability	Required operational effect	Operational scale and priorities	Examples of scalable support	Decision window & sustainment
		want of fuel [10]. Prioritise water trucking, cold chain, hospitals and distribution logistics.	chain and clinics; maintenance and spares	contribution in this assessment.
Water supply decoupled from the grid	Hold minimum safe water access through outages	Approximately 87 per cent of Havana's distribution depends on electric pumping [2]; roughly 1 million people depend on diesel trucking and around 2.7 million lack regular access [1][2]. Prioritise hospitals, dialysis units, maternity facilities and dense low-income neighbourhoods.	Solar pumping; storage; household water treatment; chlorination; trucking fuel and maintenance	Immediate; sustain through the hurricane season and beyond.
Health-service continuity	Reduce delayed-surgery and interrupted-treatment mortality, and restart routine immunization	More than 96,000 surgeries delayed, including approximately 11,000 paediatric cases, and the infant immunization programme delayed as of April [1]. Restarting routine immunization is also a regional measles priority (§3.6).	Generator and fuel support to facilities; cold-chain restoration; consumables; vaccine cold chain and campaign support	Immediate; immunization restart should not wait for grid stabilisation.
Hurricane contingency under degraded logistics	Preserve an evacuation and response capability that does not assume grid power	Nationwide, with priority to the eastern and central provinces most exposed to Atlantic tracks and least visible in current reporting. Melissa-affected recovery caseloads remain open [12].	Prepositioned NFI and shelter stock; independent communications; generator and fuel reserves for shelters and pumping; standby logistics agreements	Complete before the season peak — inside the 30-day primary horizon.
Food security and nutrition	Offset lost purchasing power and lost refrigeration	Rising food insecurity is explicitly cited in WFP's 2026–2030 country plan [3]. Prioritise groups already covered by national social protection: schoolchildren, pregnant and nursing women, and older people.	Support to national safety nets; shelf-stable and fortified commodities; local value-chain support	Ongoing through the plan period.

Recommended readiness actions

- **Fund energy, not only commodities.** An organisation that ships supplies into Cuba without solving fuel and power for the last mile may simply add to the 170-container problem.
- **Write the hurricane annex now and assume degraded national logistics.** Do not plan against Cuba's historical civil-defence performance; plan against its current fuel and power position.
- **Treat the delayed infant immunization programme as a regional measles issue,** not only a Cuban health-system issue (§3.6).
- **Track eastern and rural provinces deliberately.** Almost all available reporting is Havana-centric; absence of reporting from the provinces should not be read as absence of need.
- **Keep attribution out of programming decisions.** Responsibility is politically contested; the pumping failure, the surgical backlog and the undelivered containers are not.

Indicators and decision triggers

Indicator	Decision trigger and action
UNE-reported daily generation deficit and any national or multi-province collapse	Collapse event: verify status of water pumping, hospital generation and cold chain within 24 hours. Resolves KJ-13
NHC advisory indicating potential tropical-storm-	Issue a Flash Bulletin; activate the degraded-logistics hurricane annex; do not

Indicator	Decision trigger and action
force winds, damaging rainfall or storm surge affecting Cuba	assume national evacuation capacity is intact
Reported interruption of water trucking in any province	Water-sector escalation; prioritise fuel allocation and household treatment distribution
Status of the infant and routine immunization programme	Continued delay beyond August: raise Cuba's measles and vaccine-preventable-disease risk classification in regional planning
Undelivered humanitarian consignments held for want of fuel	Rising: escalate last-mile energy support ahead of new commodity pledges
Dengue and acute diarrhoeal disease trends (PAHO/national reporting)	Sustained rise: vector control and household water-treatment surge, targeting stored-water practices

Sources: [1] UN News and UN Resident Coordinator Cuba statements on water access, surgical delays and infant immunization, Apr 2026 — news.un.org. [2] Unión Eléctrica de Cuba and Ministerio de Energía y Minas daily generation reporting, Jul 2026, as compiled in regional reporting of UNE deficit projections and Havana water-pumping dependence, 30 Jul 2026 — figures should be verified against UNE's own daily publication. [3] WFP, Cuba Country Strategic Plan 2026–2030, presented to the Executive Board, Jun 2026 — executiveboard.wfp.org. [4] WFP, Cuba country page — wfp.org. [5] Contemporary reporting on the 10 July total disconnection, generation-versus-demand position and distributed generation offline, Jul 2026. [6] Al Jazeera, 'Cuba sees nationwide power blackout for third time in six months', 7 Jul 2026 — aljazeera.com. [7] CNN, 'Cuba hit with nationwide blackout as US pressure continues', 6 Jul 2026 — cnn.com. [8] CBS News coverage of the 6 July nationwide disconnection, Jul 2026. [9] ABC News, 'Inside Cuba's growing humanitarian crisis', 2026. [10] UN Resident Coordinator statement on undelivered humanitarian consignments, Apr 2026, as reported Jun 2026. [11] ONEI national accounts and ECLAC Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean — onei.gob.cu, cepal.org; secondary economic reporting citing a 23 per cent contraction since 2019 is reported at low confidence. [12] European Commission allocation to WFP for Hurricane Melissa-affected Cubans, May 2026. [13] PAHO, Epidemiological Update: Dengue in the Americas Region, 18 Feb 2026 — paho.org.

3.8 Amazon Basin Dry Season, Low Water and Fire — PACMO-2026-REG-008

New assessment. This entry did not appear in Issue No. 1.

Field	Assessment
Status	Watch — seasonal hazard developing on a known calendar, with national preparedness measures already activating
Hazard type	Hydrological drought and low water (river isolation, water and food supply interruption, water quality); wildfire and smoke; El Niño-driven
Operating area	Amazon Basin: Brazilian states of Amazonas, Acre, Rondônia and Pará; the Peruvian Amazon; and the Bolivian lowlands and Chiquitania. Riverine and indigenous communities are the primary exposed population
Probability	At least one state or departmental drought/low-water emergency declaration before 2 November 2026: likely (55–80%) — KJ-11. Amazon-biome fire activity Aug–Oct 2026 exceeding the same period in 2025: likely (55–80%) — KJ-12
Confidence	Moderate. The seasonal calendar and the El Niño forcing are well established; the magnitude of the vazante minimum and the effect of fire-control policy are the principal uncertainties
Caseload / exposure	No current caseload. The 2024 analogue is the planning anchor: at least 62 municipalities in Amazonas state under emergency with more than half a million people affected, grain and supply navigation halted on the Madeira, and riverine communities isolated [1][2]
Severity assessment	Not independently tiered at publication — no material current humanitarian consequences. Conditional illustrative severity for a 2023/24-scale repeat: Tier 3, on the basis of dispersed, access-constrained needs across multiple states and countries whose national systems remain functional but whose logistics depend on rivers that cease to be navigable.
Sustainment outlook	Vazante and fire season Jul–Nov 2026, with minima typically Sep–Oct. Under a very strong El Niño the more severe hydrological and fire consequences may lag into 2027

Why this belongs in an August issue

This is the first of the El Niño consequences flagged abstractly in Issue No. 1 §3.4 to acquire a date. The Amazon dry season runs July to November, and the decision windows for prepositioning, fuel staging and community water supply close before the rivers do. Adding this entry as a Watch with a conditional tier, rather than waiting for a declared emergency, is the intended use of an anticipatory product.

The Brazilian Geological Survey has published statistical vazante scenarios for the Rio Negro at Manaus based on the 1903–2025 series. The river stood at 28.50 m on 30 June 2026 in a stable condition. SGB's scenarios place the 2026 minimum between approximately 17.42 m under a median-descent scenario and as low as 12.90 m if historical extremes repeat, and note that the early pattern of the 2026 vazante resembles 2023, when Manaus fell to 12.70 m [3][4]. For calibration, the Port of Manaus recorded 12.66 m in 2024, the lowest level in 122 years of measurement [2]. PACMO does not forecast a specific stage and does not treat the extreme scenario as the expectation; the operationally useful point is that the plausible range extends into territory that has twice in three years produced a humanitarian logistics emergency.

Meteorological guidance points the same way. The El Niño Panel 2026–2027 bulletin produced by Brazil's Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation projects below-normal rainfall and above-normal temperatures across Amazonia over the coming three months, increasing evaporation, reducing soil moisture and raising water-deficit risk to pasture, perennial crops and family agriculture, with corresponding increases in vegetation dryness and fire risk [5]. Amazonas civil defence identifies river transport as its principal concern, and the state commercial association has requested measures comparable to those applied in 2024; businesses have begun advancing purchases and building stock against anticipated logistics disruption [6][7]. The Madeira and Acre rivers are flagged as the most vulnerable, having recorded intense flooding in the first quarter of 2026 that triggered emergency decrees in municipalities including Porto Velho — a flood-to-drought whiplash within a single year that erodes household and municipal coping capacity [4].

The fire dimension is a policy-and-climate interaction rather than a purely climatic one. Fire activity in the Brazilian Amazon fell roughly 70 per cent in 2025 relative to 2024, attributed in part to the end of the previous El Niño drought and to increased suppression effort [8]. The 2024 season, by contrast, saw 44.2 million acres burn in the Brazilian Amazon, more than 2.47 million acres in Bolivia, and Peru's worst fire season on record [8]. Because 2025 is an unusually low base,

KJ-12 is a relatively modest claim. Brazilian federal preparedness is under judicial pressure to anticipate rather than react, following a Supreme Federal Court decision within ADPF 743 aimed at prompting executive preparation for a very strong El Niño [9]. Analysts also caution that the most severe fire consequences of a developing El Niño typically arrive with a lag, which means the 2027 season may exceed 2026 [10].

The humanitarian mechanism in this hazard is not primarily mortality. It is isolation. When rivers cease to be navigable, riverine and indigenous communities lose access to food, fuel, medicine, cash and health referral simultaneously; water quality falls as flows stagnate, raising enteric-disease risk; boat fuel consumption rises as vessels take longer routes, raising delivery costs in already-poor communities; and smoke from concurrent fires produces respiratory presentations, including in large cities such as Manaus [1][10].

Critical capability requirements

Requirements below are anticipatory. They should be refined against SGB hydrological bulletins, state civil-defence assessments and INPE/GWIS fire monitoring as the season develops.

Priority capability	Required operational effect	Operational scale and priorities	Examples of scalable support	Decision window & sustainment
Prepositioning ahead of navigability loss	Place stocks upstream of the communities that will be cut off, while boats can still reach them	Prioritise Amazonas, Acre and Rondônia municipalities affected in 2024, the Madeira and Acre corridors, and equivalent Peruvian and Bolivian riverine districts.	Food, fuel, water-treatment and medical stock placement; community storage; shallow-draft vessel arrangements	Complete before minima. Once the river falls, the delivery cost of the same assistance rises sharply and some communities become unreachable.
Community water and treatment	Maintain safe water as flows fall and quality degrades	Riverine and indigenous communities dependent on river abstraction; prioritise communities without alternative sources.	Household water treatment; storage; well rehabilitation; rainwater harvesting	Begin now; sustain through the minima and the return of rains.
Health access and referral continuity	Preserve referral pathways when river transport fails	Prioritise chronic-disease patients, maternity cases and communities more than one day from a referral facility by boat.	Mobile health teams; medication pre-placement; telemedicine and radio referral; evacuation arrangements	Establish before minima; sustain through the season.
Fire preparedness and smoke response	Support community fire brigades and mitigate smoke exposure	Indigenous territories and community brigades in Brazil, Peru and Bolivia, which carried much of the 2023–24 response burden [10].	Fire safety equipment; brigade support and coordination; respiratory care and clean-air spaces in affected cities	Equip before the peak burning window (Aug–Oct); sustain to the return of rains.

Recommended readiness actions

- **Move stock now, not on declaration.** The defining feature of this hazard is that the transport network disappears; the window to preposition closes before the emergency is declared, not after.
- **Plan across the flood-to-drought whiplash.** Madeira and Acre communities that were flooded in the first quarter of 2026 have already spent their coping capacity this year.
- **Fund community and indigenous fire brigades before the burning window, not during it.**
- **Do not treat 2025's low fire year as the new baseline.** It coincided with the end of the previous El Niño. The forcing has returned and is stronger.
- **Watch 2027 as well as 2026.** Amazon drought and fire consequences of a strengthening El Niño characteristically lag; a moderate 2026 season is not evidence that the risk has passed.

Indicators and decision triggers

Indicator	Decision trigger and action
SGB daily Rio Negro (Manaus), Solimões (Tabatinga) and Madeira (Humaitá) stage readings against the alert and emergency thresholds	Descent tracking at or below the SGB median scenario: begin pre-positioning. Approach to alert thresholds: activate contingency and reassess for a conditional tier
State or departmental drought/low-water emergency declarations in Brazil, Peru or Bolivia	Promote this entry from Watch to Active and assign a current severity tier. Resolves KJ-11
Suspension or restriction of commercial navigation on the Madeira, Solimões or Amazonas	Supply-chain alarm; expect food and fuel price rises in dependent municipalities; accelerate delivery of pre-positioned stock
INPE/GWIS Amazon-biome hotspot counts against the 2025 and 2024 same-period baselines	Sustained exceedance of 2025: brigade support and smoke response. Approach to 2024 levels: escalate to a regional fire emergency posture. Resolves KJ-12
Air-quality and respiratory presentations in Manaus and other basin cities	Activate clean-air and respiratory-care measures, prioritising children and older people
CPC ENSO Diagnostic Discussion, 13 August and monthly thereafter	Confidence revision on the forcing behind this entire assessment (§3.4)

Sources: [1] Contemporary reporting on the 2024 Amazonas drought emergency, including state civil-defence figures on affected municipalities and population. [2] Reuters, Port of Manaus record low river level, 2024. [3] Serviço Geológico do Brasil, hydrological monitoring bulletins and 2026 vazante scenarios for the Rio Negro at Manaus, Jun–Jul 2026 — sgb.gov.br. [4] SGB hydrological outlook, 30 Jun 2026, including Madeira and Acre vulnerability and Q1 2026 flood emergency decrees — sgb.gov.br. [5] MCTI, El Niño Panel 2026–2027 bulletin, Jul 2026 — gov.br/mcti. [6] Amazonas state civil defence statements on river transport risk, May–Jul 2026. [7] Associação Comercial do Amazonas request for 2024-equivalent measures, May 2026. [8] INPE Programa Queimadas hotspot series and Rainforest Foundation US Amazon fire monitoring summaries, 2024–2025 — terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br. [9] Reporting on the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court decision within ADPF 743 on fire preparedness ahead of El Niño, May 2026. [10] Amazon Watch, ‘El Niño returns to an Amazon already on the brink’, 18 Jun 2026 — amazonwatch.org. Where a primary SGB, INPE or MCTI bulletin is available it should be preferred to any secondary report of it.

3.9 Colombia Armed-Conflict Displacement and Access Crisis — PACMO-2026-COL-009

New assessment. Promoted from the Issue No. 1 Watch List entry 'Venezuela-Colombia corridor', and substantially broadened: the corridor question turned out to be the smaller part of the Colombian picture.

Field	Assessment
Status	Active — protracted armed-conflict emergency, deteriorating
Hazard type	Complex: armed-group territorial competition driving displacement, confinement and access denial; explosive hazards; climate-related disasters; mixed migration
Operating area	Nationwide, with the most severe subregional emergencies in Catatumbo (Norte de Santander), Chocó, Cauca and Nariño. Non-state armed groups are present in approximately 60 per cent of municipalities [1]
Probability	Ongoing. At least one new mass-displacement event affecting 5,000 or more people between 3 August and 2 November 2026: very likely (80–95%) — KJ-14
Confidence	High on current-state figures; moderate on trajectory, given an election-year political environment and unsettled negotiations with several armed groups
Caseload / exposure	10.4M people projected to need humanitarian assistance in 2026 — 6.9M under the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan and 3.5M under the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan — a 30 per cent increase. The HNRP seeks US\$384 million to reach 2.6 million people. Approximately 9.9M people, some 78 per cent of the rural population, live under armed-group influence [1][2]
Severity assessment	Current national severity: Tier 3 — national institutions remain functional and lead the response, but one or more critical sectors are overwhelmed in conflict-affected areas and material unmet needs persist without sustained external assistance. Subregional severity: Tier 4 in Catatumbo, Chocó, Cauca and Nariño, where access denial, confinement and explosive hazards produce major service-continuity constraints across substantial geographic areas.
Sustainment outlook	Chronic and worsening. Add El Niño-associated drying risk to rural water and food security across the second half of 2026 (§3.4)

Operational environment

Colombia is the largest humanitarian caseload in this issue by people in need, and it is the one where the binding constraint is most clearly access rather than identification. In 2025, violence and conflict affected at least 1.6 million people — three times the 2024 figure — with the Catatumbo emergency the most severe since 2016 [1]. Catatumbo alone registered more than 62,000 people displaced and roughly 27,000 confined following clashes that began in January 2025; Colombia's Unidad para las Víctimas recorded 102,857 people internally displaced in the subregion across 2025, and OCHA data indicate the Catatumbo conflict has affected an estimated 200,000 people since 16 January 2025 [2][3]. Protection analysis describes the pattern as territorial emptying, affecting roughly 37 per cent of the dispersed rural population in populated centres of the subregion, with attendant risks of land dispossession [3].

Access denial is quantified and severe. More than one million people were denied humanitarian assistance in 2025 because of armed blockades, insecurity and access prohibitions imposed by non-state armed groups [4]. By August 2025, OCHA recorded more than 83,700 people in mass displacement events — a 94 per cent increase on the same period in 2024 — alongside a further 103,000 affected by individual displacement events and more than 879,000 facing mobility restrictions [2][5]. Confinement in the narrower sense is concentrated in the west — Cauca, Chocó, Nariño and Valle del Cauca — where communities are effectively immobilised in their own territory [2]. PACMO notes that published figures for confinement and for mobility restriction are not interchangeable and are frequently conflated in secondary reporting; the wider figure should not be substituted for the narrower one in caseload planning.

Explosive hazards are a distinct and rapidly worsening exposure. Incidents involving anti-personnel mines and unexploded ordnance rose roughly tenfold between 2021 and 2024, from 1,069 to 11,498, placing more than 607,000 people at risk of accident, displacement or confinement; civilian casualties from explosive devices rose 145 per cent between January and August 2025 against the prior year, and drone-delivered explosive attacks rose 138 per cent in the first half of 2025 [2][5]. Attacks on civilian infrastructure — principally schools and health facilities — affected 31,593 people by August 2025 [2].

Ethnic communities bear disproportionate harm: 26 per cent of those affected were Afro-Colombian and 41 per cent indigenous [2]. Child recruitment cases tripled year on year in the first half of 2025, and dozens of schools were attacked,

militarised or closed [4]. Climate-related disaster exposure compounds all of it: in the first 45 days of 2026 alone, WFP recorded more than 97,000 people affected by violence and more than 330,000 affected by weather-related events [6].

On the Venezuela corridor question carried from Issue No. 1: PACMO has not identified evidence of the earthquake-driven reversal of returnee flows that the Watch List anticipated. Assessment work published in May 2026 found that large-scale return movements to Venezuela have not materialised, though returns continue and a growing share of recent returnees intend to remain [7]. The Watch List entry is therefore retained but its direction is revised from increasing to broadly stable (§4). The corridor remains relevant, but the dominant Colombian humanitarian driver is internal armed-conflict displacement, which is why this entry supersedes the narrower one. Border militarisation following the January 2026 events in Venezuela adds a further variable to corridor movement that PACMO monitors but does not currently assess as a primary displacement driver [8].

30/90-day operational outlook

PACMO assesses that mass displacement will continue at rates consistent with 2025–26 (KJ-14), that access denial rather than funding is the principal limiter on delivery in the four Tier 4 subregions, and that the El Niño drying signal for Colombia flagged by FAO adds a slower second driver to rural food security and water access in the second half of the year (§3.4). The HNRP's deliberate narrowing — US\$384 million to reach 2.6 million of 6.9 million people in need — is itself a signal: the response has been scoped to what funding and access realistically permit rather than to assessed need, and the residual 4.3 million represent a planning gap rather than a resolved caseload [1].

Critical capability requirements

Priority capability	Required operational effect	Operational scale and priorities	Examples of scalable support	Decision window & sustainment
Humanitarian access capability	Convert available funding into delivered assistance in blockaded areas	More than one million people denied assistance in 2025 through blockades and access prohibitions [4]. Prioritise Catatumbo, Chocó, Cauca and Nariño.	Access negotiation capacity; civil-military coordination; community-based and local partner delivery; remote monitoring	Immediate and continuous. In this operating environment access capability, not commodity supply, is the limiting factor.
Rapid response to mass displacement and confinement	Meet immediate needs within days of an event, including for confined populations who cannot move	Confined communities require delivery in place, which is operationally distinct from displacement response and frequently harder [2].	Rapid-response mechanisms; multipurpose cash where markets function; in-place delivery arrangements for confined communities; protection staffing	Maintain standing capacity; KJ-14 assesses at least one qualifying event as very likely inside the horizon.
Explosive ordnance risk education and victim assistance	Reduce casualties and enable safe movement and return	More than 607,000 people at risk; a tenfold rise in incidents 2021–2024 [2][5].	Risk education; survey and clearance support; victim assistance and rehabilitation; safe-movement information	Immediate; sustain. Lead times for clearance capacity are long.
Child protection and education continuity	Interrupt recruitment pathways and keep schools functioning	Recruitment cases tripled year on year in H1 2025; schools attacked, militarised or closed [4]. Prioritise indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities.	Case management; education in emergencies; school-based protection; community prevention programming	Immediate; sustain through the school year.
Disaster response integrated with conflict response	Avoid treating repeated climate shocks and conflict displacement as separate caseloads	More than 330,000 people affected by weather events in the first 45 days of 2026 alone, frequently in the same municipalities as conflict displacement [6]. Add El Niño drying risk for the second half of 2026.	Anticipatory action; integrated targeting; water and food-security programming	Integrate now, ahead of El Niño-driven drying through Q4.

Recommended readiness actions

- **Invest in access capability, not only in programme funding.** Colombia is the clearest case in this issue where additional money without additional access produces no additional delivery.
- **Plan separately for confinement.** Confined populations cannot come to distribution points, and response models built around displacement sites will not reach them.
- **Treat the HNRP's 2.6 million target as a funded floor, not an assessment of need.** The gap to 6.9 million is a deliberate scoping decision that organisations outside the plan can partly address.
- **Integrate El Niño drying into rural programming now** rather than treating drought as a separate 2027 problem (\$3.4).
- **Retain but de-prioritise the Venezuela corridor reversal scenario.** It has not materialised; the monitoring cost is low and the consequence if it begins would be high.

Indicators and decision triggers

Indicator	Decision trigger and action
OCHA mass-displacement and confinement monitoring; Unidad para las Víctimas registration data	New event affecting 5,000 or more people: activate rapid response; resolves KJ-14
Armed-group expansion into new municipalities or departments	Reassess access corridors, hub placement and subregional tier assignments
Status of negotiations with armed groups under the 'total peace' policy	Breakdown: raise the probability of territorial competition and displacement in the affected corridor
Reported denial-of-access incidents (OCHA/humanitarian access monitoring)	Sustained rise: escalate access-negotiation capacity ahead of additional programme funding
Explosive-incident casualty trend	Sustained rise: surge risk education and victim assistance; reassess safe-movement advice for returns
R4V and DTM flow monitoring at Táchira / Norte de Santander crossings	Documented reversal of returnee flows: reactivate the corridor scenario as a full assessment
National agrometeorological drought monitoring for Caribbean and Andean Colombia	El Niño-driven deficits: integrate drought programming with conflict response in shared municipalities

Sources: [1] OCHA, Colombia Plan de Respuesta a Necesidades Humanitarias, Feb 2026, and OCHA Colombia country page — unocha.org. [2] IOM, Colombia Crisis Response Plan 2026, citing OCHA 2025 monitoring — crisisresponse.iom.int. [3] Unidad para las Víctimas displacement registration, 2025 — unidadvictimas.gov.co; Global Protection Cluster, Colombia Protection Analysis Update: Catatumbo, Norte de Santander — globalprotectioncluster.org; and Norwegian Refugee Council reporting, Jan and Mar 2026. [4] UNICEF, Colombia Humanitarian Situation Report and Humanitarian Action for Children 2026 — unicef.org. [5] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026: Colombia — hrw.org. [6] WFP Colombia country brief, Mar 2026 — wfp.org. [7] EUAA, Country of Origin Information Query: Venezuela — treatment of returnees, 26 May 2026 — euaa.europa.eu. [8] Contemporary reporting on Colombian border force mobilisation following the January 2026 events in Venezuela.

4. Watch List

Does not meet the full-assessment criteria, has probability below 20 per cent, or lacks sufficient data. Each item names the escalation trigger that would promote it to a full assessment. Direction: ▲ increasing, ▼ decreasing, ► broadly stable.

Situation	Hazard	One-line assessment & escalation trigger	Dir.
Haiti post-electoral constitutional gap — new	Governance	The 27 July CEP calendar sets definitive second-round presidential and legislative results for 7 March 2027 — a month after the 7 February constitutional handover date — and sets no date for a presidential inauguration. That is a scheduled, not contingent, legitimacy gap with displacement-contingency implications. Escalates on any public dispute over transitional authority beyond 7 February 2027, or on a CEP or government statement addressing the inauguration date. See §3.2.	▲
Bolivia economic and access crisis — new	Economic / access	Fuel, food and medicine supply were choked by roughly seven weeks of blockades before a June state of emergency and a COB pact cleared the roads; an IMF staff-level agreement for US\$1.9bn was announced in late July against forecast 2026 inflation above 20 per cent and GDP contraction. Escalates on renewed multi-week blockades, non-approval of the IMF programme, or non-renewal collapse of the state of emergency around its mid-September expiry.	►
Venezuela-Colombia corridor — revised	Displacement	The earthquake-driven reversal of returnee flows anticipated in Issue No. 1 has not materialised; May 2026 assessment work found large-scale returns had not occurred. Direction revised from increasing to broadly stable. Escalates on a DTM/R4V flow-reversal signal at Táchira / Norte de Santander crossings.	►
Haiti diphtheria — new	Epidemic	159 confirmed cases and five deaths through end-May 2026 — nearly triple the same period in 2025 — with confirmed cases in all ten departments and suspected and confirmed cases in Ouest and Artibonite displacement sites. A global antitoxin shortage makes supply, not detection, the binding constraint. Escalates on a sustained rise in confirmed cases in displacement sites or a documented antitoxin supply failure. See §3.2.	▲
Peru / Ecuador coastal El Niño — new	Flood	A Niño-1+2 anomaly of +2.7 °C in early July points to a coastal El Niño with intense coastal rainfall typically peaking December–March — beyond this horizon, but with a preparation window inside it. Escalates on an ENFEN coastal alert-level increase or national declarations.	▲
Southern Cone riverine flooding — new	Flood	The El Niño wetting phase raises flood risk in the Paraná and Uruguay basins across Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina and southern Brazil into the austral spring and summer. Escalates on GloFAS high-alert status on major basins or national emergency declarations.	▲
Dengue (regional)	Epidemic	Regional dengue remains far below recent years: 1,373,756 suspected cases at EW 26 of 2026, down 61 per cent year on year and 67 per cent against the five-year average. The forward concern is an El Niño-associated rebound into the 2026–27 southern-hemisphere season, and serotype shift. Escalates on a serotype-shift outbreak signal or a sustained reversal of the declining trend.	▼
Ecuador	Security / displacement	Security crisis continues to divert institutional capacity. Escalates on a mass-displacement event.	►
Guatemala — Volcán de Fuego / Pacaya	Volcanic	Chronic unrest at frequently active volcanoes, now against simultaneous drought and wildfire pressure on the same civil-protection system. Escalates on an INSIVUMEH alert-level change.	►

Removed from the Watch List this issue: 'South America flood zones' has been replaced by the two more specific entries above (Peru/Ecuador coastal and Southern Cone riverine), because the generic entry did not carry an actionable trigger. 'Venezuela-Colombia corridor' is retained here in narrowed form; the broader Colombian picture has been promoted to a full assessment at §3.9.

5. Forecast Verification

Issue No. 1 registered six key judgments containing eight separately verifiable forecast components. This section reports the status of every one against the criteria fixed at publication, resolves those whose conditions have been determined, and registers the ten new components introduced in Section 1. PACMO does not convert probability bands to point estimates, does not revise a published band after the fact, and does not alter a resolution criterion after the relevant period has elapsed. A single occurrence or nonoccurrence does not, by itself, prove a probabilistic judgment correct or incorrect.

5.1 Status of Issue No. 1 judgments

Judgment	Statement (abbreviated)	Band	Resolves	Status at 3 August 2026
KJ-1	Continued M5.0+ aftershocks in the Yaracuy–Carabobo–Aragua–La Guaira corridor	Very likely	12 Oct 2026	Open — tracking toward possible non-occurrence. See note 5.2.
KJ-2	Below-average Dry Corridor smallholder primera harvest and Phase 3 expansion	Likely	30 Sep 2026	Open — evidence trending toward occurrence. FEWS NET's June Honduras outlook records persistent rainfall deficits, Crisis outcomes among poor rural households and 500,000–749,999 people requiring assistance peaking Jun–Aug.
KJ-3a	El Niño persists through DJF 2026–27	Very likely	Feb 2027	Open — strongly supported. CPC states a 97 per cent chance of persistence through early spring 2027.
KJ-3b	El Niño reaches at least moderate strength at peak	Likely	Feb 2027	Open — strongly supported and, in hindsight, conservatively banded. The band is not revised. KJ-10 registers the sharpened forward judgment.
KJ-4	2026 Atlantic named-storm count below the 1991–2020 average	Likely	30 Nov 2026	Open — evidence trending toward occurrence. CSU's 8 July update forecasts 9 named storms against a 14.4 average, with net activity at 40–45 per cent of normal.
KJ-5	2026 regional measles total of at least 25,000 confirmed cases	Very likely	Jan 2027	Effectively determined; formal resolution Jan 2027. PAHO reports 43,559 confirmed cases through EW 27. See the important caveat at 5.3.
KJ-6a	Haiti August first-round elections proceed on schedule	Roughly even	31 Aug 2026	Resolved early — outcome did not occur. The 30 August round was suspended; the CEP published a revised calendar on 27 July setting the first round for 13 December 2026.
KJ-6b	Violence during the August electoral period generates new displacement	Likely	31 Aug 2026	Resolved — indeterminate. The criterion's referent no longer exists. See the tradecraft note at 5.4.

5.2 KJ-1 tracking note: the aftershock judgment may be wrong, and it is worth saying so now

KJ-1 assessed it very likely (80–95%) that M5.0-or-greater aftershocks would continue in the Venezuelan corridor through 12 October 2026, on the basis of standard aftershock decay behaviour and a sequence that had produced more than 1,100 events by 8 July. The resolution criterion requires at least one M5.0+ event with an epicentre in the corridor between 13 July and 12 October.

Two facts now sit uncomfortably with that judgment. First, FUNVISIS records the largest aftershock of the entire sequence as mb 5.0, occurring on 24 June — the day of the foreshock–mainshock pair, and nearly three weeks before the verification window opened. Second, the events reported through July have overwhelmingly been below M4.0; the sequence continues in count (approximately 1,463 aftershocks by 22 July) but not in magnitude. PACMO therefore assesses that KJ-1 is tracking toward possible non-occurrence.

The nature of the underlying error is worth stating precisely, because the obvious reading is the wrong one. Reasoning from decay behaviour to a continued supply of M5+ events was not in itself unsound: Båth's law implies a largest aftershock roughly 1.1 to 1.2 magnitude units below the mainshock, which for an M7.5 event would be of order M6.3 —

comfortably above the KJ-1 threshold and comfortably above anything the sequence has produced. What this sequence has actually done is fall more than a magnitude unit short of that standard expectation. PACMO's error, if it proves to be one, was to treat a standard expectation as a safe one, and to publish a very likely band without first checking the observed magnitude distribution against it.

A second, narrower design fault is now visible. KJ-1 was written as 'M5.0-or-greater' without naming a magnitude scale or a reporting agency. FUNVISIS reports the sequence's largest event as mb 5.0 — a body-wave magnitude — while USGS reports moment magnitude, and the two are not interchangeable at this threshold. Because the sequence's largest event sits exactly on the stated number, the ambiguity is decisive rather than academic. This is the same class of fault identified at 5.3, and it will have to be settled at resolution on 12 October. Future magnitude thresholds will specify the scale and the reporting agency.

This is reported in August rather than in October for three reasons. It has an immediate posture consequence, set out in §3.1: the case for holding heavy trauma surge capacity in theatre is weaker than the July judgment implied, while the case for structural engineering capacity is unchanged. It is the kind of correction that a forecaster is tempted to leave until the resolution date, when it can be reported alongside whatever else happened. And a verification register that only reports outcomes at expiry is not much use to anyone making decisions in between.

PACMO does not revise the KJ-1 band. It resolves on 12 October against the criterion as written.

5.3 KJ-5 caveat: the threshold was crossed by a change in case definition

PAHO's regional cumulative total moved from 22,974 confirmed cases at EW 25 to 43,559 at EW 27, comfortably above the 25,000 threshold. The KJ-5 criterion explicitly anticipated retrospective revision, so on its own terms the outcome is effectively determined.

PACMO nonetheless records that the crossing is attributable to a reporting-basis change rather than to transmission. Guatemala retrospectively added 20,078 cases by including epidemiologically linked and clinically confirmed cases alongside laboratory-confirmed ones. Removing that adjustment leaves a regional cumulative total of approximately 23,500 through EW 27 — that is, below the 25,000 threshold on a basis approximately comparable with the data available when the judgment was written. PACMO notes this reconciliation is approximate, because PAHO also restated prior-period weekly figures in the same revision, so the pre-change series cannot be reconstructed exactly from the published totals. The threshold would very likely still have been crossed later in the year on the original basis, given continuing transmission; but it had not been crossed at the point the published figure suggested it had.

The lesson PACMO takes is about criterion design rather than about measles: a threshold expressed in units that a reporting authority may redefine mid-period is a weaker forecast than it looks. Future case-count judgments will specify the case definition as well as the number, and future magnitude judgments will specify the scale and reporting agency.

5.4 KJ-6b tradecraft note: compound judgments inherit their premise's failure

KJ-6b assessed it likely that violence during Haiti's August electoral period would generate new displacement. Because the August electoral period does not exist, the criterion has no referent. Under the fixed-criteria rule PACMO does not rewrite it to point at the December period, and does not score it. It resolves as indeterminate.

The structural fault is that KJ-6b silently inherited KJ-6a's premise. It was written as an independent judgment but was in fact conditional on an event PACMO had itself assessed at only a roughly even chance — which means it had at best a coin-flip probability of ever being resolvable. Future issues will either state such judgments conditionally ('if the first round is held in the stated month, then ...') or decompose them into components that resolve regardless of the premise. KJ-9 in this issue is written to the second standard: its statement and its criterion describe the same observable event, and it does not depend on any milestone in fact occurring.

The operational recommendation attached to KJ-6b has not been invalidated by the judgment's failure to resolve. Issue No. 1 advised staging displacement-contingency capacity ahead of the electoral period; §3.2 of this issue advises holding and re-dating it. Preparedness that was correct for August is still correct for December.

5.5 New judgments registered this issue

Judgment	Statement (abbreviated)	Probability	Resolves
KJ-7	More than 15,000 people remain in official Venezuelan transitional camps	Likely	2 Nov 2026
KJ-8	Documented multi-facility interruption or rationing of essential care in earthquake-affected Venezuela caused by medical-supply shortage	Roughly even	2 Nov 2026
KJ-9	The CEP or Government of Haiti publicly announces a change to at least one date in the 27 July electoral calendar	Likely	2 Nov 2026
KJ-10a	CPC categorises the 2026–27 El Niño as strong or greater at peak	Very likely	Apr 2027
KJ-10b	CPC categorises the event as very strong at peak	Very likely	Apr 2027
KJ-11	At least one Amazon Basin state or department in Brazil, Peru or Bolivia declares a drought or low-water emergency	Likely	2 Nov 2026
KJ-12	Amazon-biome fire activity Aug–Oct 2026 exceeds the same period in 2025	Likely	30 Nov 2026
KJ-13	At least one further national or multi-province grid collapse in Cuba	Very likely	2 Nov 2026
KJ-14	At least one new Colombian mass-displacement event affecting 5,000 or more people	Very likely	2 Nov 2026
KJ-15	Earthquake-relief transaction authority is maintained beyond the 23 October expiry of OFAC General License 60	Likely	2 Nov 2026

Resolution criteria

These criteria are fixed at publication. Later issues may clarify source availability or reporting lag, but will not change an outcome threshold after the relevant period has elapsed.

Component	Resolution criterion
KJ-7	Outcome occurred if OCHA situation reporting, IOM/DTM or Venezuelan authorities report more than 15,000 people resident in official transitional camps on any date within the week of 2 November 2026. Record as indeterminate if no camp-population figure is published within 14 days either side of that date. Where a reported decline below the threshold is attributable to site de-registration, consolidation or reclassification rather than to housing delivery or verified return, PACMO will record the component as indeterminate rather than as non-occurrence.
KJ-8	Outcome occurred if the Venezuelan health ministry, PAHO, OCHA or a named operational partner reports shortage-driven rationing, suspension, patient deferral or loss of treatment capacity at two or more health facilities, or across one documented multi-facility provider network, in the earthquake-affected states between 3 August and 2 November 2026. General shortage warnings, or exhaustion of warehouse stocks without a documented service consequence, do not satisfy the criterion. PACMO records that in an access-constrained environment the absence of documentation is weaker evidence of non-occurrence than it would ordinarily be, and will note that limitation at resolution.
KJ-9	Outcome occurred if the CEP or the Government of Haiti publicly announces a change to any date published in the 27 July 2026 electoral calendar, including the 13 December first round, before 2 November 2026. Nine calendar milestones fall inside the window; an announced change to any one of them satisfies the criterion. Observed slippage in execution without an announced change to a published date does not.
KJ-10a / KJ-10b	Outcome occurred if NOAA CPC categorises the peak strength of the 2026–27 El Niño as strong or greater (KJ-10a), or as very strong (KJ-10b), in its ENSO strength product, RONI historical index table or ENSO Diagnostic Discussions published in or before April 2027. The criterion is written against CPC's own categorisation rather than a PACMO-selected numeric threshold, because CPC's 2026 discussions use the relative Niño-3.4 index (RONI) and a fixed traditional-ONI threshold would not be directly comparable.
KJ-11	Outcome occurred if a state government in Brazil, or a regional or departmental government in Peru or Bolivia, declares a drought, low-water or navigation emergency affecting Amazon Basin riverine populations between 3 August and 2 November 2026.

Component	Resolution criterion
KJ-12	Outcome occurred if INPE Programa Queimadas or the Global Wildfire Information System records more Amazon-biome fire hotspots during August–October 2026 than during August–October 2025, using the same product and detection platform for both periods.
KJ-13	Outcome occurred if Cuba's Unión Eléctrica, the Ministry of Energy and Mines, or credible international reporting documents a national or multi-province disconnection of the national electrical system between 3 August and 2 November 2026.
KJ-14	Outcome occurred if OCHA, the Colombian Unidad para las Víctimas, or IOM/DTM documents a single mass-displacement event affecting 5,000 or more people between 3 August and 2 November 2026.
KJ-15	Outcome occurred if OFAC publishes, on or before 23 October 2026, an extension or amendment of General License 60, or a successor general license, that authorizes earthquake-relief-related transactions in Venezuela beyond 23 October 2026. Continued operation of the pre-existing General License 29, without a GL 60 extension or successor, does not satisfy the criterion. Record as outcome did not occur if no such publication has been made by 2 November 2026.

5.6 A note on a judgment that did not survive review

An earlier draft of this issue registered a KJ-8 forecasting that ‘at least one acute watery diarrhoea or waterborne-disease cluster is reported’ in a Venezuelan displacement site. It was removed before publication. Across 107 official camps plus an unenumerated informal caseload, where residents already describe widespread diarrhoea and PAHO is already running camp surveillance, that threshold was low enough that the judgment forecast the existence of a report rather than a material deterioration — and its resolution would have depended more on surveillance visibility than on humanitarian conditions. Issue No. 1 committed that judgments which cannot fail will not appear in this section; a judgment that is nearly certain to resolve as occurred for reasons unrelated to the underlying risk falls under the same objection. The waterborne-disease risk is real and remains carried as an indicator and decision trigger in §3.1, which is the right instrument for it. The replacement KJ-8 forecasts an operational failure — shortage-driven interruption of care — that is genuinely uncertain, is tied to a dated warning already in the evidence base, and does not duplicate KJ-7.

5.7 Register summary

Metric	Value
Components registered to date	18 (8 in Issue No. 1, 10 in Issue No. 2)
Resolved — outcome did not occur	1 (KJ-6a)
Resolved — indeterminate	1 (KJ-6b)
Open	16, of which one (KJ-5) is effectively determined pending formal resolution in January 2027
Judgments flagged as tracking toward non-occurrence	1 (KJ-1)

The Annual Accuracy Report will publish the complete judgment register and compare observed outcome frequencies with published probability bands where sample sizes permit. With eighteen components registered across two issues and two resolved, no meaningful calibration statement is yet possible, and PACMO will not offer one.

Annex A — Estimative Language & Confidence

Adapted from U.S. Intelligence Community Directive 203. Terms outside this table are not used as probability statements. Confidence is stated separately from probability. Probability bands are intentionally broad ordinal categories, not point estimates. PACMO does not infer a midpoint or other single-number probability for verification.

Term	Probability range	Note
Remote	< 5%	Tail scenarios worth planning against
Very unlikely	5–20%	
Unlikely	20–45%	
Roughly even chance	45–55%	
Likely	55–80%	
Very likely	80–95%	
Almost certain	> 95%	Never 100%

Confidence	Meaning
High	Multiple independent, high-quality sources converge; well-understood mechanism; strong base rate
Moderate	Credible sourcing with gaps, or sound method on incomplete data
Low	Fragmentary, contested, or single-source; assessment could change substantially

Annex B — Response Severity Tiers

Tier	Operational definition	Likely response implication
1	Localised event within the expected capability of local or subnational systems. Essential services remain functional and needs are generally accessible.	Limited external support may be useful, but routine local and national mechanisms should be sufficient.
2	Local or subnational capacity is exceeded in one or more sectors, but national response systems remain broadly functional.	Targeted NGO, technical, logistics or financial support may be required.
3	National capacity is significantly strained, or one or more critical sectors are overwhelmed in the affected area. Material unmet needs are likely without sustained external assistance.	International assistance and enhanced multi-sector coordination are likely to be required.
4	National response capacity is overwhelmed across multiple sectors or substantial geographic areas, with major infrastructure, access, logistics or service-continuity constraints.	Major international mobilisation and sustained multi-sector support are required.
5	Systemic state-capacity failure, nationwide or near-nationwide multi-sector collapse, or access and security conditions that prevent essential needs from being met at scale.	Prolonged, large-scale international support is required, potentially including external coordination and service-delivery functions normally performed by the state.

Tier assignment methodology. PACMO severity tiers estimate the unmet response gap relative to the affected country's baseline and residual response capacity, informed by PACMO Country Capacity Profiles where available and updated for event-specific degradation; they are not assigned automatically from caseload. Assessments consider the number and condition of people affected; mortality and morbidity; disruption of infrastructure and essential services; geographic concentration and humanitarian access; local and national emergency-management, health, logistics and fiscal capacity; pre-existing humanitarian needs; institutional functionality; and response resources already available or committed. Residual capacity means capacity remaining after event-related degradation and concurrent

crises. Similar-sized events may therefore receive different tiers in different countries. Current severity applies to realised crises. Watches and cross-cutting drivers are not independently tiered unless they generate measurable current consequences. Advisory and contingency scenarios may use conditional illustrative tiers based on the specific country and scenario. Multi-country entries receive an aggregate regional tier only when meaningful, and country- or locality-level variation must be stated — as it is this issue for Guatemala within \$3.6 and for Catatumbo, Chocó, Cauca and Nariño within \$3.9.

Annex C — Method & Standing Sources

This issue synthesises public authoritative sources into one hemispheric, multi-hazard, forward-looking picture, translates cited needs into priority capabilities and readiness decisions, and applies a country-specific baseline and residual-capacity assessment to severity. PACMO does not generate independent physical-hazard, climate, epidemiological or food-security model outputs. It produces original analytic judgments by synthesising and citing the outputs of USGS, NOAA/NHC/CPC, FEWS NET, IPC, PAHO/WHO, IOM/DTM, OCHA, FAO, UNDRR, IRI, SGB, INPE and national scientific and statistical agencies, together with historical base rates and structured analytic judgment. Full methodology: pacmo.org/methodology.

Source-quality practice, restated for this issue. PACMO prefers the primary agency product over any secondary report of it. Several instruments underpinning this issue are directly citable and are cited as such: the CEP's own electoral calendar note of 27 July (§3.2), OFAC General License 60 and the associated Treasury and State Department publications (§3.1), CPC's ENSO Diagnostic Discussion and RONI strength-probability product (§3.4), and Guatemala's MSPAS Protocol V3, which created the measles reporting discontinuity (§3.6). Where a figure nonetheless reaches PACMO through regional press reporting of a primary product — as remains the case for parts of §3.3, §3.7 and §3.8 — that is stated in the text and the figure is reported at reduced confidence. Readers should prefer the primary FEWS NET, SGB, INPE, MCTI, UNE, ONEI, WFP or PAHO product wherever one is available, and should not treat a figure's appearance in this publication as verification of it.

Corrections policy. Substantive errors are corrected in place with a dated note and announced through PACMO channels; the uncorrected original is archived. Corrections to Issue No. 1 are recorded in the Document Control section of this issue. Analytical misses are addressed in Section 5, never silently revised.

House conventions. PACMO uses British spelling in its own prose, retaining the spelling of proper names, official product titles and legal instruments as published by the issuing body — hence 'outbreak-response immunization' and 'General License' alongside 'prioritise' and 'organisation'. Probability and percentage figures are written as 'per cent' in prose; the per-cent symbol is reserved for probability bands, case-fatality ratios and credible intervals.

Annex D — Acronyms and Operational Terms

Acronyms are expanded here for cross-sector readers. Formal agency and programme names follow the usage in cited sources; operational terms retain their ordinary humanitarian or emergency-management meaning. Terms new to this issue are marked with an asterisk.

Acronym / term	Meaning
ACA*	Associação Comercial do Amazonas
ADPF*	Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental (Brazilian constitutional action)
CARICOM*	Caribbean Community
CARPHA*	Caribbean Public Health Agency
CATI	Case-area targeted intervention
CENAO*	Centro de Estudios Atmosféricos, Oceanográficos y Sísmicos, Honduras
CEP*	Conseil Électoral Provisoire (Provisional Electoral Council), Haiti
CFR*	Case fatality ratio
CFSv2*	NCEP Climate Forecast System version 2
CIIFEN*	Centro Internacional para la Investigación del Fenómeno de El Niño

Acronym / term	Meaning
CMAM	Community-based management of acute malnutrition
COB*	Central Obrera Boliviana
CONRED*	Coordinadora Nacional para la Reducción de Desastres, Guatemala
COPECO	Permanent Contingency Commission of Honduras
CPC	Climate Prediction Center, NOAA
Cri*	Credible interval
CSP*	Country Strategic Plan (WFP)
CSU*	Colorado State University
CTC / CTU	Cholera treatment centre / cholera treatment unit
CVA	Cash and voucher assistance
DJF	December–January–February seasonal period
DPT3*	Third dose of diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus vaccine (coverage indicator)
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
ECLAC*	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL)
ENFEN*	Comisión Multisectorial Encargada del Estudio Nacional del Fenómeno El Niño, Peru
ENSO	El Niño–Southern Oscillation
EP	Eastern Pacific
EW*	Epidemiological week
EWARS	Early Warning, Alert and Response System
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FinCEN*	Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. Department of the Treasury
FUNVISIS	Venezuelan Foundation for Seismological Research
GBV	Gender-based violence
GHO*	Global Humanitarian Overview
GL-29*	U.S. Treasury OFAC Venezuela General License 29 (NGO humanitarian projects meeting basic human needs)
GL-60	U.S. Treasury OFAC Venezuela General License 60
GloFAS	Global Flood Awareness System
GWIS*	Global Wildfire Information System
HNRP*	Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan
HRP*	Humanitarian Response Plan
ICG	International Coordinating Group on Vaccine Provision

Acronym / term	Meaning
IMF*	International Monetary Fund
INAMEH	National Institute of Meteorology and Hydrology, Venezuela
INPE*	Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, Brazil
INSIVUMEH	National Institute for Seismology, Volcanology, Meteorology and Hydrology, Guatemala
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRI*	International Research Institute for Climate and Society
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
M (earthquake)	Earthquake magnitude as reported by the source agency; mb denotes body-wave magnitude and Mw moment magnitude
MAGA*	Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Alimentación, Guatemala
MCTI*	Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação, Brazil
MSF*	Médecins Sans Frontières
MSPAS*	Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social, Guatemala
MSPP	Ministry of Public Health and Population, Haiti
NFI	Non-food item
NHC	National Hurricane Center
NMME*	North American Multi-Model Ensemble
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NRC*	Norwegian Refugee Council
NSAG*	Non-state armed group
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCV	Oral cholera vaccine
OFAC	Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury
ONEI*	Oficina Nacional de Estadística e Información, Cuba
ONI*	Oceanic Niño Index
OTP	Outpatient therapeutic programme
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
Postrera	Second Central American planting season, typically Aug-Sep planting with Nov-Dec harvest
Primera	First Central American planting season, typically May-Jun planting with Aug-Sep harvest
R4V	Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela
RMRP*	Refugee and Migrant Response Plan

Acronym / term	Meaning
RONI*	Relative Oceanic Niño Index — Niño-3.4 anomalies minus the tropical mean, rescaled; the index CPC uses in its 2026 discussions
Rt*	Effective reproduction number
RUTF	Ready-to-use therapeutic food
SAG*	Secretaría de Agricultura y Ganadería, Honduras
SAM	Severe acute malnutrition
SAR	Search and rescue
SGB*	Serviço Geológico do Brasil
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDRR	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNE*	Unión Eléctrica, Cuba
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAR	Urban search and rescue
USGS	U.S. Geological Survey
Vazante*	The falling-water season of Amazon rivers, typically Jul–Nov
VSR*	Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 591
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

END OF DOCUMENT — PACMO-OUT-2026-08 v1.0

Next scheduled issue: PACMO-OUT-2026-09, 7 September 2026. Publication cadence moves to the first Monday of each month.