# PACMO

**PAN-AMERICAN CRISIS MONITORING ORGANIZATION**

# MONTHLY REGIONAL CRISIS OUTLOOK

JULY 2026 | Issue No. 1 (Inaugural)

*Anticipatory analysis for humanitarian posture — 30- and 90-day horizons*

Coverage period: 13 July – 12 October 2026



Document No. PACMO-OUT-2026-07 | Published 13 July 2026 | Next scheduled issue: 3 August 2026

# Document Control

| Field | Entry |
|---|---|
| Document number | PACMO-OUT-2026-07 |
| Version | 1.0 |
| Publication date | 13 July 2026 |
| Coverage period | 30-day primary horizon to 12 August 2026; 90-day extended horizon to 12 October 2026 |
| Prepared by | PACMO Analysis Desk |
| Status | Inaugural issue. Section 5 registers baseline judgments for public verification beginning with Issue No. 2. |
| Corrections & changes | None at publication |
| Contact | contact@pacmo.org \| pacmo.org |

### Standard caveat

PACMO projections are probabilistic assessments intended to inform preparedness posture. They are not deterministic predictions and are not a substitute for official warnings issued by national authorities. Probability and confidence terms are defined in Annex A and used consistently throughout. PACMO does not issue earthquake predictions; seismic content is limited to exposure analysis, scenario planning, and operational aftershock forecasting drawn from published scientific sources. All casualty and damage figures for ongoing events are preliminary and subject to revision; where official and independent counts diverge materially, both are reported.

# Contents

# 1. Regional Operating Picture

The hemisphere enters the 13 July – 12 August period with two major active response burdens and one emerging cross-cutting climate driver. The first is the 24 June Venezuela earthquake doublet (M7.2/M7.5) — the country's strongest seismic event in over a century — which is assessed at current Tier 4 response severity because multi-sector demand is overwhelming residual capacity across the affected states; Tier 5 escalation remains possible if upper-bound caseloads are validated or residual capacity deteriorates further. The second is Haiti, where 5.8 million people face Crisis-level or worse food insecurity amid armed-group control of the capital, 1.4 million internally displaced, and first-round elections scheduled for August that constitute the period's most significant political risk trigger. The cross-cutting driver is the formal onset of El Niño in June 2026: it is already suppressing Dry Corridor rainfall during the primera season, it underpins a below-normal Atlantic hurricane forecast paired with an above-normal Eastern Pacific forecast, and it opens a 3–6 month anticipatory-action window that is the highest-leverage posture opportunity in this issue.

The most consequential posture consideration this month is concurrent pressure on regional response capacity. The Venezuela response is absorbing regional USAR, EMT, logistics, and funding capacity at scale — including a US contribution exceeding $386 million and a UN flash appeal of $296 million — at the same moment the Haiti response plan sits below 20% funded. Organizations planning for a second major event this quarter (a Caribbean hurricane landfall or further deterioration in Haiti) should assume regional surge capacity is materially thinner than the seasonal baseline and preposition accordingly.

## Key judgments this month

- KJ-1: It is very likely (80–95%) that aftershocks of M5.0 or greater will continue in the Yaracuy–Carabobo–Aragua–La Guaira corridor through the 90-day horizon, causing incremental damage to already-compromised structures and periodically interrupting recovery operations. (High confidence — standard aftershock decay behavior; over 1,100 aftershocks recorded by FUNVISIS through 8 July.)
- KJ-2: It is likely (55–80%) that smallholder primera harvests across the Central American Dry Corridor will be below average, expanding Crisis (IPC Phase 3) populations by September 2026. (Moderate confidence — adopting FEWS NET most-likely scenarios for Honduras and El Salvador.)
- KJ-3: It is very likely (80–95%) that El Niño conditions persist through the December 2026 – February 2027 season, and likely (55–80%) that the event reaches at least moderate strength at peak. (Moderate confidence — NOAA CPC probabilistic forecasts; event strength remains the principal uncertainty.)
- KJ-4: It is likely (55–80%) that the 2026 Atlantic season finishes below the long-term average for named storms, consistent with the NOAA outlook. This is not a low-risk statement for the Caribbean: Hurricane Melissa (2025) demonstrated that a single system can generate a major humanitarian emergency regardless of seasonal totals. (Moderate confidence.)
- KJ-5: It is very likely (80–95%) that the Americas will record at least 25,000 confirmed measles cases during full-year 2026. PAHO had already reported 22,974 confirmed cases through epidemiological week 25 (ending 27 June), compared with approximately 14,900 during all of 2025; continued transmission is expected in populations with immunity gaps and along major travel and mass-gathering corridors. (High confidence — PAHO regional surveillance; the principal uncertainty is final magnitude, not whether 2026 exceeds 2025.)
- KJ-6: There is a roughly even chance (45–55%) that Haiti's scheduled August 2026 first-round elections proceed on schedule; during the August electoral period, violence episodes are likely (55–80%) to generate new displacement. (Low confidence — fluid security environment and uncertain attribution.)

# 2. Regional Risk at a Glance

Entries are included when they represent an active crisis with material humanitarian consequences, a developing hazard with a credible path to such consequences during the assessment horizon, or a cross-cutting driver with material implications for multiple regional crises. Severity is assessed relative to country-specific baseline and residual response capacity under Annex B; caseload is one input, not an automatic tier threshold. Current severity is used for realized crises. Watches and advisories are not independently

tiered unless they are producing measurable current consequences; conditional scenarios may use illustrative tiers tied to the specific country and event. Probability language is defined in Annex A.

| Crisis ID | Crisis | Status | 30-day trajectory | Severity assessment | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PACMO-2026-VEN-001 | Venezuela earthquake emergency | Active | Needs increasing; aftershock rate declining | Current Tier 4; Tier 5 escalation potential | 3.1 |
| PACMO-2026-HTI-002 | Haiti complex emergency | Active | Deteriorating; election risk window ahead | Current Tier 5 | 3.2 |
| PACMO-2026-CAM-003 | Dry Corridor lean season / El Niño | Active | Deteriorating through September | Current regional Tier 3; Tier 4 escalation potential | 3.3 |
| PACMO-2026-REG-004 | El Niño 2026–27 hemispheric impacts | Watch | Developing; 3–6 month lead time | Not independentl y tiered | 3.4 |
| PACMO-2026-REG-005 | 2026 Atlantic & Eastern Pacific cyclone seasons | Advisory | Season entering active phase Aug–Oct | Conditional scenarios only | 3.5 |
| PACMO-2026-REG-006 | Measles multi-country outbreak | Active | Continued transmission; gathering risk | Current regional Tier 2 | 3.6 |

Status categories: Active — a realized event or crisis producing current humanitarian consequences. Watch — a developing driver or situation requiring monitoring but not yet producing material current consequences or not meeting the active-entry criteria. Advisory — a seasonal or conditional hazard warranting readiness action despite no active event affecting populated areas.

# 3. Operational Area Assessments

## 3.1 Venezuela Earthquake Emergency — PACMO-2026-VEN-001

| Field | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Status | Active — emergency stabilization phase, week 3 |
| Hazard type | Seismic — M7.2/M7.5 doublet (24 June) with ongoing aftershock sequence; secondary landslide, WASH-failure, and epidemic risks |
| Operating area | Yaracuy, Carabobo, Aragua, Falcón, Miranda, Capital District (Caracas), and La Guaira (declared disaster zone). Rupture ~175 km along the San Sebastián fault system [2] |
| Probability | Event realized. Continued M5+ aftershocks through 90-day horizon: very likely (80–95%) |
| Confidence | High on hazard trajectory; moderate on impact figures (official figures preliminary; damage estimates vary by scope and methodology — see below) |
| Caseload / exposure | 1.3M (UN appeal planning figure) – 6.8M (IOM upper estimate); central working estimate 1.8M (UNICEF) [4][6][7] |
| Severity assessment | Current severity: Tier 4. Rationale: multi-state water-system failure, extensive structural damage, large shelter and health needs, and limited residual fiscal and institutional capacity atop 7.9M people already requiring assistance. Tier 5 escalation potential if upper-bound caseloads are validated or residual response capacity deteriorates further. |

| Field | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Sustainment outlook | Acute phase ongoing; aftershock and secondary-risk window extends through October and beyond; WASH, shelter, and continuity-of-care requirements should be planned as multi-month operations, not short-duration relief activities |

## Operational environment

On 24 June at 18:04 local time, an M7.2 earthquake struck near San Felipe, Yaracuy, followed 39 seconds later by an M7.5 event near Yumare — a rare doublet, the strongest shaking in Venezuela in over 125 years, rupturing approximately 175 km of the San Sebastián fault system eastward toward Caracas and La Guaira [1][2]. USGS issued red PAGER alerts for both events [2][12]. As of 12 July, Venezuelan authorities reported 4,490 deaths, 16,740 injuries, and 17,907 people left homeless; these figures remain preliminary and may change as assessments continue [15]. Damage estimates also vary substantially because they use different scopes and methodologies: UNDP's 26 June satellite-based rapid assessment estimated $6.7 billion in direct physical damage to housing and economic assets, excluding infrastructure damage, wider economic disruption, and reconstruction costs [11], while a subsequent UNDRR analytical model estimated approximately $37 billion in direct physical damage to buildings and infrastructure (roughly $24B buildings, $13B infrastructure) [14]. PACMO treats these as separate preliminary estimates rather than directly comparable revisions. NASA satellite damage analysis has flagged roughly 58,870 structures as damaged, which anchors the structural-assessment planning scale below [1] [3]. The national water system has failed across seven states; more than 400 schools and multiple hospitals are damaged [4][5]. FUNVISIS recorded over 1,100 aftershocks through 8 July, with frequency decaying normally (86 on 28 June, 30 on 29 June) [1][13].

Response operations across the Yaracuy–Carabobo–Aragua–La Guaira corridor remain in the emergency stabilization phase. Transition to sustained recovery is constrained by structural-assessment throughput, widespread water-system failure, continued aftershock activity, and rainfall-driven landslide exposure. A $296M UN flash appeal for 1.3M people over six months is open; UNICEF requires $52M within a wider $137.6M appeal that was only 35% funded pre-earthquake; IOM has issued a flash appeal for July–December [4][6][7]. The US response exceeds $386M with DART and USAR deployments; OFAC General License 60 authorizes earthquake-relief transactions through 23 October 2026 [8][9]. Fourteen DEC member agencies are responding [5].

## 30/90-day operational outlook

Three drivers dominate the forward period. First, habitability attrition: continued M5+ aftershocks (very likely) will progressively downgrade damaged-but-standing structures; absent rapid first-pass damage screening followed by nationally authorized building-safety evaluations, the sheltered population (~17,000 official) is likely (55–80%) to grow substantially as unsafe buildings are identified or fail — official shelter capacity (22,477) would be exceeded in that scenario [1][3]. Second, WASH-driven disease risk: with water systems failed across seven states during the May–November rainy season, localized outbreaks of waterborne disease in shelter concentrations and low-income urban areas are likely (55–80%) within 90 days without sustained safe-water operations. Third, compounding hazards: USGS has published landslide-hazard analysis for the sequence; earthquake-loosened slopes plus seasonal rainfall make deadly landslide events in the coastal range likely (55–80%) at localized scale through the rainy season [2]. The 1999 Vargas tragedy occurred in this same coastal geography and should anchor worst-case planning for La Guaira.

## Priority operational objective and supporting priorities

Priority operational objective: accelerate first-pass damage screening and nationally authorized building-safety evaluation of hospitals, schools, shelters, critical infrastructure, and high-density residential areas — screening and evaluation throughput is the binding operational constraint, and every downstream caseload estimate (shelter, water, health) depends on its output.

Supporting priorities: sustain emergency water access while restoring priority network segments; protect continuity of medical care; establish shelter health surveillance; stage landslide-response capability along the coastal corridor.

## Critical capability requirements

Operational-scale descriptions identify the system-wide problem, priority areas, and useful contribution types. They are not procurement targets for any single organization; field requirements should be refined through nationally authorized assessments and sector coordination.

| Priority capability | Required operational effect | Operational scale and priorities | Examples of scalable support | Decision window & sustainment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Structural screening and safety evaluation | Identify and prioritize damaged critical facilities and high-density housing for nationally authorized occupancy decisions | Approximately 58,870 structures have been flagged through remote analysis. Initial prioritization should focus on hospitals, schools, shelters, critical infrastructure, and high-density residential areas. Field-assessment requirements depend on national procedures, access, and validation of remote findings [1][3]. | Deployable exterior-screening cells; standardized documentation; remote engineering review; support to nationally authorized building-safety evaluation teams | Mobilize immediately; prioritize critical facilities and high-density housing before rainfall intensifies. Sustain screening, safety evaluation, and reinspection as conditions require. |
| Emergency water services | Maintain minimum safe water access while damaged networks are restored | Up to 1.8M people may require partial or intermittent support while damaged systems are restored. Prioritize network repair, treatment and pumping capacity, storage, household treatment, and emergency distribution to locations without viable alternatives [4][6][7]. | Treatment units; network-repair teams; district tanker operations; chlorination supplies; household treatment; storage and pumping capacity | Activate immediately; sustain until priority networks and reliable local supply are restored. |
| Continuity of care | Prevent indirect mortality from interrupted NCD, dialysis, maternal, and mental-health care | Seven affected states; prioritize verified service disruptions, facilities serving large catchments, and continuity for high-risk patients. | Mobile clinics; medication resupply; cold chain; dialysis consumables; MHPSS teams | Mobilize immediately where services are interrupted; sustain through restoration of reliable referral, medication, cold-chain, and dialysis capacity. |
| Transitional shelter | Move families out of unsafe structures and open air before rains peak | 17,907 people confirmed homeless; caseload is likely to rise as screening and safety evaluations proceed. Urban conditions favor rental support and host-family assistance over large camps. | Rental-support programming; transitional-shelter support; host-family support; NFI kits | Begin programming as safety assessments identify uninhabitable housing; plan for multi-month support. |
| Shelter health surveillance | Detect waterborne and vector-borne outbreaks early in displacement concentrations | 87+ official shelters; prioritize surveillance in larger or high-risk shelter concentrations and vector control in urban debris fields. | EWARS support; environmental-health teams; larviciding capacity | Establish immediately in priority shelter concentrations; sustain through the rainy season. |

### Recommended readiness actions

- Offer structural-engineering capacity now — exterior-screening cells, standardized documentation, remote review, or support to nationally authorized building-safety evaluation teams. This is the highest-value international contribution this month; every week of delay holds families in unsafe buildings through an active aftershock sequence.
- Use the OFAC GL-60 window: front-load procurement, banking arrangements, and prepositioning before the 23 October expiry, and document transactions against the license [9].
- Plan water operations as a distributed, months-long effort pairing immediate trucking in priority districts with network-repair partnerships from day one.
- Stage landslide contingency capability (search equipment, shelter stocks) in the coastal-range corridor before peak rains; monitor USGS sequence landslide products and FUNVISIS bulletins.
- Organizations on the Colombia–Venezuela corridor: monitor for earthquake-driven reversal of returnee flows — see Watch List.

### Indicators and decision triggers

| Indicator | Decision trigger and action |
|---|---|
| Aftershock ≥M6.0 within 50 km of Caracas–La Guaira (USGS/FUNVISIS) | Escalation trigger: Flash Bulletin; assume increased failure risk among damaged or restricted-occupancy structures; surge trauma posture |
| Acute watery diarrhea cluster in any shelter (PAHO/national surveillance) | Activate acute watery diarrhea investigation and treatment posture; escalate cholera-specific measures if confirmed |
| Official shelter population exceeding 22,000 capacity | Shelter-sector escalation; accelerate rental-support scale-up |
| GL-60 lapse or non-renewal signals approaching 23 October | Accelerate procurement; brief donors on payment-channel risk |
| 48-hour rainfall >100 mm in the coastal range (INAMEH/forecast models) | Landslide watch; preposition SAR along the Vargas-corridor communities |

### Sources

[1] Wikipedia (aggregating USGS, FUNVISIS, GFZ), '2026 Venezuela earthquakes', accessed 12 Jul 2026 — en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Venezuela_earthquakes

[2] USGS event page & tectonic summary, M7.5 Yumare, incl. finite-fault and landslide products — earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eventpage/us6000t7zp

[3] WMNF live updates citing official figures and NASA damage analysis, 8 Jul 2026 — wmnf.org/venezuela-earthquake-live-updates-july-8-2026

[4] UN News, 'Venezuela earthquake disaster: needs skyrocketing', Jul 2026 — news.un.org/en/story/2026/07/1167850

[5] IRC/DEC appeal materials, 1 Jul 2026 — rescue.org

[6] UNICEF USA, Venezuela earthquakes response overview, Jul 2026 — unicefusa.org

[7] OCHA Venezuela country page & Situation Report No. 14, 7 Jul 2026 — unocha.org/venezuela

[8] US Department of State, 'Responding to Venezuela Earthquakes', Jul 2026 — state.gov/responding-to-venezuela-earthquakes

[9] US Treasury OFAC, Venezuela General License 60, 25 Jun 2026

[10] Miyamoto International, Venezuela earthquake engineering updates, 1 Jul 2026 — miyamotointernational.com

[11] UNDP, 'Venezuela faces US$6.7 billion in economic losses from earthquakes, UNDP estimates', 26 Jun 2026 — undp.org

[12] USGS PAGER red alerts for us6000t7zc / us6000t7zp

[13] OCHA Venezuela situation snapshot, 30 Jun 2026 (GDACS red alert; 2.4M exposed to severe shaking) — unocha.org

[14] UNDRR, 'Analytical estimate of damages caused by the June 24, 2026 earthquakes in Venezuela', Jul 2026 — undrr.org

[15] Reuters, 'Death toll from Venezuela earthquakes rises to 4,490', 12 Jul 2026 — reuters.com

## 3.2 Haiti Complex Emergency — PACMO-2026-HTI-002

| Field | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Status | Active — protracted complex emergency, deteriorating |
| Hazard type | Complex: armed-group violence and displacement; acute food insecurity; epidemic (cholera resurgence); high cyclone exposure with minimal coping capacity |
| Operating area | Nationwide; violence concentrated in Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and Centre/Artibonite departments, with displacement pressure into Grand Sud and Grand Nord [3] |
| Probability | Ongoing. Further deterioration over 90 days: likely (55–80%) |
| Confidence | High on current-state figures (IPC/IOM/OCHA); low on the electoral trajectory |
| Caseload / exposure | 5.83M in IPC Phase 3 or worse, representing 52% of the analyzed population, including nearly 1.9M in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency); approximately 1.4M internally displaced [1][2][3][6] |
| Severity assessment | Current severity: Tier 5. Rationale: nationwide food insecurity and displacement, armed-group constraints on access, degraded health and public services, and insufficient national and international capacity to meet current needs. |
| Sustainment outlook | Chronic with known planning milestones and acute risk windows: August first-round elections; Atlantic season peak (Aug–Oct); rainy-season cholera transmission |

### Operational environment

Haiti remains the hemisphere's most severe protracted crisis. The current IPC update places 5.83 million people — 52% of the analyzed population — in Crisis (Phase 3) or worse, with nearly 1.9 million in Emergency (Phase 4) [1][2]. The updated IPC snapshot does not report a population classified in Phase 5 (Catastrophe) for the March–June period; descriptions of hundreds of thousands in 'famine-level conditions' should therefore not be treated as an IPC classification. Internal displacement stands near 1.4 million (approximately 12% of the population), driven by armed-group control of most of the capital and expansion into regional departments [3][6]. Only 41% of hospital-bed facilities in Port-au-Prince remain fully functional, and roughly 1,600 schools closed in the last academic year [4]. An April 2026 fuel-price shock (gasoline +29%, diesel +37%) is feeding directly into food prices, threatening earlier modest food-security gains [5]. Cholera transmission resurged in 2025 against limited WASH access, and Hurricane Melissa (October 2025) — which killed at least 46 people in Haiti and damaged or destroyed extensive housing and infrastructure — demonstrated the compounding cost of cyclone exposure without coping capacity [3]. The Humanitarian Response Plan ($880M) was under 20% funded as of April [2]. First-round elections are scheduled for August 2026, contingent on security conditions [6].

### 30/90-day operational outlook

PACMO assesses a roughly even chance (45–55%) the August first round proceeds on schedule, and — whether held or postponed — a likely (55–80%) probability of violence episodes producing new displacement in the tens of thousands during the electoral period. The July–October window overlays three seasonal risks on this known electoral milestone and potential violence/displacement trigger: peak hurricane exposure (see 3.5 — seasonal totals do not reduce Haiti's single-storm risk, as Melissa demonstrated during a season with below-average named-storm and hurricane counts but unusually high major-hurricane intensity), peak rainy-season cholera transmission in displacement sites, and El Niño-associated drought risk to Haitian agriculture flagged by FAO — during the 2015–16 El Niño, Haitian harvests collapsed by up to 70%, doubling food insecurity within months [7]. The next IPC analysis will set the food-security baseline into the fall; PACMO assesses it is unlikely (20–45%) to show improvement given the fuel-price shock and funding collapse.

### Critical capability requirements

Operational-scale descriptions identify priority areas and useful contribution types. Haiti's binding constraints are access and funding, not needs identification; field requirements should be refined through current government, OCHA, IOM/DTM, health, and nutrition reporting.

| Priority capability | Required operational effect | Operational scale and priorities | Examples of scalable support | Decision window & sustainment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Therapeutic nutrition pipeline | Prevent child mortality from severe acute malnutrition | ~125,000 children in the national SAM caseload [4]; maintain continuity from procurement through outpatient and stabilization services. | RUTF procurement or funding; outpatient therapeutic program (OTP) and stabilization-centre staffing; supply-chain and last-mile support | Commit immediately; verify current supplier, freight, customs, and in-country lead times and maintain the pipeline through Q4. |
| Cyclone prepositioning | Enable an initial response within 72 hours despite access constraints if a system strikes | Departmental hubs, Grand Sud & Grand Nord priority; IOM maintains 6 prepositioning points [8] | NFI/shelter stocks; anticipatory cash mechanisms; standby logistics agreements | Complete staging before mid-August season peak; hold stocks distributed and accessible through October |
| Cholera readiness | Hold case fatality below 1% if resurgence accelerates | CTC/CTU capacity and chlorine required in Ouest/Artibonite; maintain case-area targeted intervention capability | Treatment kits; case-area targeted intervention (CATI) teams; WASH surge; support assessment and, where criteria are met, an ICG request for OCV | Stage within 4 weeks; sustain through rainy season |
| Electoral displacement contingency | Provide immediate support for new displacement without service collapse | Metropolitan Port-au-Prince and likely receiving areas; scale against current IOM/DTM, OCHA, and security reporting. Protection and GBV surge capacity remain critical [3]. | NFI and hot-meal capacity; protection staffing; GBV services; site management support | Activate before the first round; maintain a replenishment plan and revise the caseload as displacement reporting evolves. |
| Multipurpose cash | Preserve household purchasing power after the fuel-price shock | Transfer values indexed to the post-shock food basket, where markets function | CVA programming; market monitoring | Begin immediately; ongoing sustainment |

### Recommended readiness actions

- Treat the August electoral period as a known planning milestone and potential displacement trigger: complete displacement-contingency staging and access-negotiation channels in July.
- Protect the RUTF and cholera-supply pipelines first — longest lead times, least tolerance for funding interruption.
- Size hurricane posture to Haiti's vulnerability, not the seasonal forecast; anchor on the Melissa precedent.
- Do not draw down Haiti-dedicated capacity toward the Venezuela response; the two emergencies compete for the same regional surge resources, and Haiti's funding position (<20%) leaves no buffer.

### Indicators and decision triggers

| Indicator | Decision trigger and action |
|---|---|
| Electoral calendar decisions / postponement announcements | Confirm or revise the displacement-contingency posture based on the calendar decision; maintain readiness for violence-related displacement under either outcome |
| NHC advisory or associated hazard product indicates potential tropical-storm-force winds, damaging rainfall, or storm surge affecting Hispaniola | Issue a Flash Bulletin at the first material indication; set staging deadlines against NHC's earliest reasonable arrival time of tropical-storm-force winds, not cone contact |
| Weekly suspected cholera cases (MSPP/PAHO) rising for 3 consecutive weeks | Activate cholera surge posture; support assessment and, where criteria are met, an ICG request for OCV |
| Next IPC publication | Re-baseline food-security assessment; reassess Haiti's current severity and Phase 4 caseloads |
| Armed-group expansion into new departments (OCHA/DTM) | Reassess access corridors and prepositioning-hub placement |

## Sources

[1] IPC, 'Haiti: Acute Food Security Situation Projection Update, March–June 2026' — ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1162842

[2] UN News / WFP, 'More than half of Haitians continue to face food crisis', Apr 2026 — news.un.org/en/story/2026/04/1167328

[3] OCHA Haiti country page (incl. Melissa impact and cholera resurgence) — unocha.org/haiti

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[6] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026: Haiti (displacement, electoral calendar) — hrw.org

[7] FAO, 'El Niño is coming. Here is where the risks are highest' (2015–16 Haiti harvest precedent), Jun 2026 — fao.org

[8] IOM, Haiti Crisis Response Plan 2026 (prepositioning network) — crisisresponse.iom.int

## 3.3 Central American Dry Corridor — Lean Season & El Niño Onset — PACMO-2026-CAM-003

| Field | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Status | Active — lean season intensifying; anticipatory window still partly open |
| Hazard type | Drought / food insecurity (slow-onset), El Niño-driven |
| Operating area | Dry Corridor of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua; sharpest in the Eastern Dry Corridor (El Salvador), central Honduras (Yoro, El Paraíso, Olancho), and the Western Altiplano/Alta Verapaz (Guatemala) [1][2] |
| Probability | Below-average smallholder primera harvest: likely (55–80%) |
| Confidence | Moderate — adopting FEWS NET most-likely scenarios |
| Caseload / exposure | Millions region-wide in IPC Phase 2–3; UNICEF preparedness planning references ~410,000 at risk incl. 167,000 children across Northern Central America/Nicaragua [4]. PACMO tracks the incremental Phase 3 expansion through September |
| Severity assessment | Current regional severity: Tier 3. Rationale: geographically dispersed, slow-onset needs across several countries whose national systems remain partly functional, but current assistance is insufficient to prevent expanding Crisis-level food insecurity. Country-level severity varies. Tier 4 escalation potential if the postrera also fails and response gaps widen. |
| Sustainment outlook | Lean-season peak Jun–Sep 2026; postrera outcomes Sep–Dec set the trajectory into 2027 |

### Operational environment

El Niño conditions emerged in June 2026 [1][6]. FEWS NET reports below-average, erratically distributed rainfall with above-average temperatures across the Dry Corridor through June, with cumulative deficits near 45 mm in parts of central Honduras and a pronounced dry belt where totals reached only 45–60% of average into Nicaragua [1]. Delayed primera planting has cut demand for agricultural labor — a primary income source for poor households — while elevated fuel and fertilizer prices raise input and food costs [1][2]. Poor rural households across the Dry Corridor are already in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) as of June, with stocks depleted atypically early [1]. FEWS NET projects Crisis outcomes to expand and peak June–September [1][2]. The historical anchor is severe: the 2015–16 El Niño left roughly 3.5 million people food insecure across the Dry Corridor [7]. Current assistance is localized and insufficient in scale to change area classifications [2].

### 30/90-day operational outlook & anticipatory window

This is the issue's clearest anticipatory-action opportunity, because the harvest calendar makes the decision windows knowable in advance. FAO and WFP have launched a joint El Niño anticipatory-action appeal (June 2026–March 2027) [6]. PACMO assesses it is likely (55–80%) that anticipatory cash and livelihood support delivered before the September postrera planting will be substantially more cost-effective than post-harvest emergency response, consistent with the anticipatory-action evidence base. A below-average primera is recoverable; a failed postrera (Sep–Dec) converts this into a Tier 4 multi-country event into 2027.

### Critical capability requirements

Operational-scale descriptions identify priority areas and useful contribution types. Country programs should use current national assessments, market data, admission trends, and planting calendars to set caseloads, transfer values, and procurement quantities.

| Priority capability | Required operational effect | Operational scale and priorities | Examples of scalable support | Decision window & sustainment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anticipatory cash | Prevent negative coping (asset sales, meal reduction) before the lean-season trough | Target households projected to deteriorate from IPC Phase 2 to Phase 3 in deficit municipalities; set transfer values using current market and minimum-expenditure-basket analysis. | CVA funding or delivery; targeting support; national safety-net top-ups | Commit now — deliver before September postrera planting; the highest-leverage pre-planting window narrows sharply after planting |
| Therapeutic nutrition prepositioning | Prevent U5 mortality as admissions rise through the lean season | Country-specific U5 SAM caseloads based on current national nutrition surveys, verified admissions, and program coverage gaps. | RUTF procurement; CMAM/OTP capacity | Initiate procurement and capacity checks now; verify supplier and in-country lead times against the expected rise in admissions. |
| Water access | Sustain household and productive water through deficit months | Prioritize deficit municipalities where household and productive water access is already deteriorating; favor rehabilitation, harvesting, and local supply restoration over routine trucking. | Water-point rehabilitation; harvesting/catchment; targeted trucking | Begin immediately where deficits are affecting access; sustain through the lean-season and planting windows. |
| Postrera planting support | Protect the second harvest — the season that determines 2027 | Drought-tolerant seed and inputs per smallholder census in deficit municipalities | Seed systems; input vouchers; extension support | Complete distribution before the Aug–Sep postrera window |

### Recommended readiness actions

- Fund and deliver anticipatory cash now — one of the highest-leverage actions identified in this issue; the pre-planting anticipatory window narrows sharply after postrera planting.
- Order therapeutic-food stocks against the global pipeline immediately; RUTF pipeline disruption is a recurrent operational risk during nutrition-response scale-up.
- Watch the postrera, not just the primera, and align programming with the FAO–WFP joint anticipatory appeal to avoid duplication.

### Indicators and decision triggers

| Indicator | Decision trigger and action |
|---|---|
| Next FEWS NET / IPC Dry Corridor updates | Re-baseline Phase 3 populations; reassess country-level and regional severity |
| Postrera planting-window rainfall (Aug–Sep) | Rainfall deficits sufficient to materially delay or reduce postrera planting, as identified by FEWS NET or national agrometeorological monitoring: reassess whether Tier 4 regional severity criteria are met |
| National red-alert declarations (e.g., COPECO Honduras) | Align with national systems; scale cash delivery |

| Indicator | Decision trigger and action |
|---|---|
| Regional staple prices (maize/beans) vs. 5-yr average | Sustained >30% above average: purchasing-power alarm; revisit transfer values |

## Sources

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[2] FEWS NET, El Salvador Food Security Outlook Update, Apr 2026 — fews.net

[3] FEWS NET, Honduras Food Security Outlook, Feb 2026 — fews.net

[4] UNICEF LAC, Humanitarian Situation and Risks in the Central American Dry Corridor — unicef.org/lac

[5] FEWS NET, El Niño 2026–2027 topic page — fews.net/topics/el-nino-2026-2027

[6] FAO, El Niño–WFP Joint Anticipatory Action Appeal Jun 2026–Mar 2027 — fao.org

[7] FAO, 'El Niño is coming' (2015–16 Dry Corridor 3.5M figure), Jun 2026 — fao.org

## 3.4 El Niño 2026–27 Hemispheric Impacts — PACMO-2026-REG-004

| Field | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Status | Watch — climate driver developing; 3–6 month lead time on impacts |
| Hazard type | Climate driver (composite): drives drought, flood, and cyclone-pattern risks across the hemisphere |
| Operating area | Hemispheric. Drying: Central America, northern South America, Caribbean (incl. Colombia, Venezuela, Cuba, Hispaniola). Wetting/flood: much of South America |
| Probability | Persistence through DJF 2026–27: very likely (80–95%). Moderate-or-stronger peak: likely (55–80%) |
| Confidence | Moderate — NOAA/WMO probabilistic forecasts; peak strength is the key uncertainty |
| Caseload / exposure | No standalone caseload; impacts are captured in 3.2, 3.3, and 3.5. Earlier emergence forecasts cited WMO probabilities of 70–80% and a NOAA probability of 82% for onset by July |
| Severity assessment | Not independently tiered. El Niño is a cross-cutting climate driver; severity is expressed through the affected crisis entries and any realized drought, flood, or cyclone events. |
| Sustainment outlook | Peak intensity expected late 2026; impacts run into Q1 2027 |

### Operational environment — and why a climate driver earns a standing assessment

El Niño is not itself a crisis but a force multiplier that raises the correlated probability of several assessments in this issue simultaneously — which is why a synthesis publication tracks it as one entry rather than scattering it across others. NOAA and WMO forecasts converge on a high probability of persistence through the Northern Hemisphere winter, with FEWS NET and FAO already attributing observed Dry Corridor drying to its onset [1][2][3]. FAO's cross-hazard risk mapping flags agricultural-drought probability above 50% across the Dry Corridor and Caribbean and specifically names Colombia and Venezuela among northern South American drying risks — directly compounding the Venezuela recovery (3.1) [4]. The operational value of El Niño is its lead time: impacts arrive 3–6 months downstream of the signal visible now, which is why anticipatory action is unusually well-justified this quarter.

### Recommended readiness actions

- Treat El Niño as the cross-cutting driver linking the Haiti, Dry Corridor, and cyclone assessments: one driver is raising several risks at once, which argues for coordinated rather than siloed prepositioning.
- Factor northern South America drying into the multi-month water planning in 3.1 — reduced source availability compounds the earthquake WASH crisis.
- Track the August NOAA outlook update and the next WMO ENSO bulletin as the key confidence-revision points.

### Sources

[1] NOAA CPC / AOML, El Niño development probabilities (82% onset by Jul; DJF persistence) — aoml.noaa.gov; cpc.ncep.noaa.gov

[2] WFP, 'Latin America and the Caribbean faces increased food insecurity risks due to El Niño' (WMO 70–80%) — wfp.org

[3] FEWS NET, El Niño 2026–2027 — fews.net

[4] FAO, 'El Niño is coming for agriculture' cross-hazard risk mapping, Jun 2026 — fao.org

## 3.5 2026 Atlantic & Eastern Pacific Cyclone Seasons — PACMO-2026-REG-005

| Field | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Status | Advisory — entering the historically active Aug–Oct phase |
| Hazard type | Tropical cyclone |
| Operating area | Atlantic basin (Caribbean, Gulf, US/Mexican/Central American coasts); Eastern Pacific (Mexican Pacific coast, Central America) |
| Probability | Below-normal Atlantic season total: likely (55–80%). Above-normal Eastern Pacific season: likely (55–80%) |
| Confidence | Moderate — NOAA seasonal outlook; individual landfalls are not seasonally forecastable |
| Caseload / exposure | Conditional — no active caseload at publication. Landfall scenarios below are conditional and pre-assessed for illustrative severity |
| Severity assessment | Not currently tiered. No active landfall emergency at publication; conditional landfall scenarios are assessed below against country-specific exposure and residual capacity. |
| Sustainment outlook | Season to 30 Nov; peak mid-Aug through Oct |

### Operational environment — the below-normal trap

NOAA's May outlook gives a 55% chance of a below-normal Atlantic season, forecasting 8–14 named storms, 3–6 hurricanes, and 1–3 major hurricanes, with El Niño-driven wind shear the suppressing factor; the Eastern Pacific is forecast above-normal (15–22 named storms) [1][2][5]. Tropical Storm Arthur already formed and dissipated in June [3]. The critical framing for humanitarian posture is that seasonal storm totals do not translate directly into landfall risk, and lower basin-wide counts do not guarantee a low-consequence season. In 2025, the Atlantic produced 13 named storms and five hurricanes — below the 1991–2020 averages — but four major hurricanes, including three Category 5 storms. Hurricane Melissa, one of the strongest hurricanes on record in the Atlantic basin, illustrates how a season with modest overall counts can still generate an extreme humanitarian disaster [6]. PACMO will issue event-specific Flash Bulletins when NHC advisories or associated hazard products indicate a material risk of tropical-storm-force winds, damaging rainfall, storm surge, or other significant impacts to populated land in the coverage area.

### Landfall planning scenarios

| Scenario | Conditional severity assessment | Staging implication |
|---|---|---|
| Cat 3+ landfall, Hispaniola (Haiti/Dominican Republic) | Illustrative Tier 4 for a major Haiti impact; Dominican Republic severity requires a separate assessment against national and subnational capacity. | Stage NFI/shelter at Grand Sud & Grand Nord nodes before peak; complete time-sensitive actions before NHC's earliest reasonable arrival time of tropical-storm-force winds |
| Cat 3+ landfall, Central America Caribbean coast | Illustrative Tier 3; final severity varies by country, impact corridor, access, and residual capacity. | Swiftwater rescue and roof-repair capability; access-corridor clearance capacity |
| Eastern Pacific major, Mexican/Central American Pacific coast | Illustrative Tier 2–3; final severity varies by country, infrastructure disruption, access, and residual capacity. | Above-normal EP forecast raises this probability; apply the same monitoring and readiness criteria to NHC Eastern Pacific advisories |

### Recommended readiness actions

- Do not stand down Caribbean posture on the below-normal forecast; size staging to single-storm vulnerability, especially for Haiti.

- Give the above-normal Eastern Pacific forecast symmetric attention — Mexican and Central American Pacific coasts are the exposure.
- PACMO standing escalation trigger: issue a Flash Bulletin at the first material indication in NHC advisories or associated hazard products of significant impacts to populated land in the coverage area; use NHC's earliest reasonable arrival time of tropical-storm-force winds as the operational clock for time-sensitive preparations.

## Sources

[1] NOAA, 'NOAA predicts below-normal 2026 Atlantic hurricane season', 21 May 2026 — noaa.gov

[2] NOAA AOML, El Niño impact on 2026 Atlantic season — aoml.noaa.gov

[3] Wikipedia, 2026 Atlantic hurricane season (TS Arthur; forecast compilation) — en.wikipedia.org

[4] Colorado State University, Extended Range Forecast (ACE ~75% of normal), Apr 2026 — tropical.colostate.edu

[5] NOAA/NHC seasonal outlook figures via multiple outlets, Jun 2026

[6] NOAA, '2025 Atlantic hurricane season marked by striking contrasts', 25 Nov 2025 — noaa.gov

## 3.6 Measles Multi-Country Outbreak — PACMO-2026-REG-006

| Field | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Status | Active — sustained regional transmission |
| Hazard type | Epidemic (vaccine-preventable) |
| Operating area | Multi-country; 17 countries and territories reporting confirmed cases through epidemiological week 25 [2][3] |
| Probability | Full-year 2026 cases reaching at least 25,000: very likely (80–95%) |
| Confidence | High — PAHO regional surveillance; principal uncertainty is final magnitude |
| Caseload / exposure | PAHO reported 22,974 confirmed cases across 17 countries and territories through epidemiological week 25, ending 27 June 2026, including 39 deaths. The total had already substantially exceeded the approximately 14,900 cases reported during all of 2025 [2][3] |
| Severity assessment | Current regional severity: Tier 2. Rationale: sustained multi-country transmission requires targeted public-health support, but national response systems remain broadly functional. Local severity may be higher in low-coverage, displaced, and indigenous communities. |
| Sustainment outlook | Ongoing; mass-gathering amplification risk through the 2026 FIFA World Cup window and continued travel-linked importation |

### Operational environment

PAHO rates the regional public-health risk from measles as 'Very High.' Through epidemiological week 25, ending 27 June, the Americas had reported 22,974 confirmed cases across 17 countries and territories, including 39 deaths — already well above the approximately 14,900 cases reported during all of 2025 [2][3]. Declining and uneven vaccination coverage, accumulated immunity gaps, international travel, and delayed detection continue to support regional transmission. Among confirmed cases with known status, the large majority are unvaccinated, with highest incidence in infants under one year [3]. PAHO flags mass-gathering amplification in the context of the 2026 FIFA World Cup and recommends heightened active case-finding [1]. Highest vulnerability falls on children under five, indigenous populations, migrants, and communities with limited health access [2] — precisely the populations concentrated in this issue's other assessments (Venezuela shelters, Haitian displacement sites, Dry Corridor rural poor).

### Recommended readiness actions

- Verify measles vaccination coverage in any population your organization shelters or serves under the other assessments in this issue — displacement concentrations are amplification points.
- Organizations operating around World Cup host cities and travel corridors: align with PAHO active-case-finding guidance.
- Support supplementary immunization activities in low-coverage zones as the cost-effective preventive measure.

### Sources

[1] PAHO, measles epidemiological alerts (3 Feb 2026; 29 May 2026) — paho.org

[2] PAHO, Measles Multi-Country Outbreak 2026 ('Very High' risk assessment) — paho.org/en/measles-multi-country-outbreak-2026

[3] PAHO, 'Situation Report #6: Measles in the Americas Region', 2 Jul 2026 — paho.org

## 4. Watch List

Does not meet the full-assessment criteria, has probability below 20%, or lacks sufficient data. Each item names the escalation trigger that would promote it to a full assessment. Direction: ▲ increasing, ▼ decreasing, ► broadly stable.

| Situation | Hazard | One-line assessment & escalation trigger | Direction |
|---|---|---|---|
| Venezuela–Colombia corridor | Displacement | Earthquake could reverse recent returnee inflows into renewed outflow; escalates on DTM/R4V flow-reversal signal at Táchira/Norte de Santander crossings | ▲ |
| Dengue (Andean/Southern Cone) | Epidemic | 2026 regional dengue down ~63% year on year, but DENV-3 spread flagged by PAHO; escalates on serotype-shift outbreak signal | ▼ |
| Ecuador | Security/displacement | Security crisis diverting institutional capacity (per capacity profile); escalates on mass-displacement event | ► |
| South America flood zones | Flood | El Niño wetting phase raises riverine flood risk into austral spring/summer; escalates on GloFAS high-alert on major basins | ▲ |
| Guatemala — Volcán de Fuego / Pacaya | Volcanic | Chronic unrest at frequently active volcanoes; escalates on INSIVUMEH alert-level change | ► |

## 5. Forecast Verification

As the inaugural issue, PACMO has no prior-issue judgments to verify. This section registers the baseline: the six key judgments in Section 1 contain eight separately verifiable forecast components, each with a published probability band, resolution date, and fixed outcome criterion. Issue No. 2 (3 August 2026) will update the status of every component and resolve any whose horizon has elapsed. PACMO will not convert probability bands to point estimates. Each component will be recorded as outcome occurred, outcome did not occur, or indeterminate against the criteria below. The Annual Accuracy Report will publish the complete judgment register and compare observed outcome frequencies with the published probability bands where sample sizes permit; a single occurrence or nonoccurrence does not, by itself, prove a probabilistic judgment correct or incorrect.

A note on discipline, from our own drafting process: an earlier draft of this issue stated a measles judgment ('2026 will exceed the 2025 total') that had already resolved before publication — PAHO surveillance showed the threshold crossed in June. It was replaced with a genuinely forward-resolving judgment (KJ-5 below). Judgments that cannot fail are not forecasts, and they will not appear in this section.

| Judgment | Statement (abbreviated) | Probability | Resolves |
|---|---|---|---|
| KJ-1 | Continued M5+ aftershocks in Venezuela corridor | Very likely | 12 Oct 2026 |
| KJ-2 | Below-average Dry Corridor smallholder primera harvest and Phase 3 expansion | Likely | 30 Sep 2026 |
| KJ-3a | El Niño persists through DJF 2026–27 | Very likely | Feb 2027 |
| KJ-3b | El Niño reaches at least moderate strength at peak | Likely | Feb 2027 |
| KJ-4 | 2026 Atlantic named-storm count finishes below the long-term average | Likely | 30 Nov 2026 |
| KJ-5 | 2026 regional measles total reaches at least 25,000 confirmed cases | Very likely | Jan 2027 |
| KJ-6a | Haiti August first-round elections proceed on schedule | Roughly even | 31 Aug 2026 |
| KJ-6b | Violence during the August electoral period generates new displacement | Likely | 31 Aug 2026 |

### Resolution criteria

These criteria are fixed at publication. Later issues may clarify source availability or reporting lag, but will not change an outcome threshold after the relevant period has elapsed.

| Judgment component | Resolution criterion |
|---|---|
| KJ-1 | Outcome occurred if USGS or FUNVISIS records at least one M5.0+ aftershock with an epicenter in the Yaracuy–Carabobo–Aragua–La Guaira corridor between 13 July and 12 October 2026. |
| KJ-2 | Outcome occurred if FEWS NET, IPC, or relevant national assessments published by 30 September characterize smallholder primera harvests as below average in affected Dry Corridor areas and indicate expansion of IPC Phase 3 populations by September. |
| KJ-3a | Outcome occurred if NOAA CPC classifies conditions during DJF 2026–27 as El Niño. |
| KJ-3b | Outcome occurred if NOAA CPC classifies the event peak as moderate strength or stronger. |
| KJ-4 | Outcome occurred if the final NOAA/NHC 2026 Atlantic named-storm count is below the 1991–2020 average. |
| KJ-5 | Outcome occurred if PAHO reports at least 25,000 confirmed measles cases for full-year 2026 in its final or retrospectively revised regional total. |
| KJ-6a | Outcome occurred if nationally recognized first-round presidential elections are held during August 2026; it did not occur if the vote is postponed beyond August or is not held. |
| KJ-6b | Outcome occurred if OCHA, IOM/DTM, or other authoritative reporting documents new displacement caused by armed violence during the August electoral period. Record as indeterminate if reporting cannot distinguish electoral-period displacement from background violence. |

## Annex A — Estimative Language & Confidence

Adapted from U.S. Intelligence Community Directive 203. Terms outside this table are not used as probability statements. Confidence is stated separately from probability.

Probability bands are intentionally broad ordinal categories, not point estimates. PACMO does not infer a midpoint or other single-number probability for verification. Confidence is reported separately and is not treated as probability.

| Term | Probability range | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Remote | < 5% | Tail scenarios worth planning against |
| Very unlikely | 5–20% | |
| Unlikely | 20–45% | |
| Roughly even chance | 45–55% | |
| Likely | 55–80% | |
| Very likely | 80–95% | |
| Almost certain | > 95% | Never 100% |

| Confidence | Meaning |
|---|---|
| High | Multiple independent, high-quality sources converge; well-understood mechanism; strong base rate |
| Moderate | Credible sourcing with gaps, or sound method on incomplete data |

| Confidence | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Low | Fragmentary, contested, or single-source; assessment could change substantially |

## Annex B — Response Severity Tiers

| Tier | Operational definition | Likely response implication |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Localized event within the expected capability of local or subnational systems. Essential services remain functional and needs are generally accessible. | Limited external support may be useful, but routine local and national mechanisms should be sufficient. |
| 2 | Local or subnational capacity is exceeded in one or more sectors, but national response systems remain broadly functional. | Targeted NGO, technical, logistics, or financial support may be required. |
| 3 | National capacity is significantly strained, or one or more critical sectors are overwhelmed in the affected area. Material unmet needs are likely without sustained external assistance. | International assistance and enhanced multi-sector coordination are likely to be required. |
| 4 | National response capacity is overwhelmed across multiple sectors or substantial geographic areas, with major infrastructure, access, logistics, or service-continuity constraints. | Major international mobilization and sustained multi-sector support are required. |
| 5 | Systemic state-capacity failure, nationwide or near-nationwide multi-sector collapse, or access and security conditions that prevent essential needs from being met at scale. | Prolonged, large-scale international support is required, potentially including external coordination and service-delivery functions normally performed by the state. |

Tier assignment methodology: PACMO severity tiers estimate the unmet response gap relative to the affected country's baseline and residual response capacity, informed by PACMO Country Capacity Profiles where available and updated for event-specific degradation; they are not assigned automatically from caseload. Assessments consider the number and condition of people affected; mortality and morbidity; disruption of infrastructure and essential services; geographic concentration and humanitarian access; local and national emergency-management, health, logistics, and fiscal capacity; pre-existing humanitarian needs; institutional functionality; and response resources already available or committed. Residual capacity means capacity remaining after event-related degradation and concurrent crises. Similar-sized events may therefore receive different tiers in different countries. Current severity applies to realized crises. Watches and cross-cutting drivers are not independently tiered unless they generate measurable current consequences. Advisory and contingency scenarios may use conditional illustrative tiers based on the specific country and scenario. Multi-country entries receive an aggregate regional tier only when meaningful, and country- or locality-level variation must be stated.

## Annex C — Method & Standing Sources

This issue synthesizes public authoritative sources into one hemispheric, multi-hazard, forward-looking picture, translates cited needs into priority capabilities and readiness decisions, and applies a country-specific baseline and residual-capacity assessment to severity. PACMO does not generate independent physical-hazard, climate, epidemiological, or food-security model outputs. It produces original analytic judgments by synthesizing and citing the outputs of USGS, NOAA/NHC/CPC, FEWS NET, IPC, PAHO/WHO, IOM/DTM, OCHA, FAO, UNDRR, and national scientific

agencies, together with historical base rates and structured analytic judgment. Full methodology: pacmo.org/methodology.

Corrections policy: substantive errors are corrected in place with a dated note and announced through PACMO channels; the uncorrected original is archived. Analytical misses are addressed in Section 5, never silently revised.

## Annex D — Acronyms and Operational Terms

Acronyms are expanded here for cross-sector readers. Formal agency and program names follow the usage in cited sources; operational terms retain their ordinary humanitarian or emergency-management meaning.

| Acronym / term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| ACE | Accumulated Cyclone Energy |
| AOML | Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory |
| CATI | Case-area targeted intervention |
| CMAM | Community-based management of acute malnutrition |
| COPECO | Permanent Contingency Commission of Honduras |
| CPC | Climate Prediction Center |
| CTC | Cholera treatment centre |
| CTU | Cholera treatment unit |
| CVA | Cash and voucher assistance |
| DART | Disaster Assistance Response Team |
| DEC | Disasters Emergency Committee |
| DENV-3 | Dengue virus serotype 3 |
| DJF | December–January–February seasonal period |
| DTM | Displacement Tracking Matrix |
| EMT | Emergency Medical Team |
| ENSO | El Niño–Southern Oscillation |
| EP | Eastern Pacific |
| EWARS | Early Warning, Alert and Response System |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations |
| FEWS NET | Famine Early Warning Systems Network |
| FIFA | Fédération Internationale de Football Association |
| FUNVISIS | Venezuelan Foundation for Seismological Research |
| GBV | Gender-based violence |
| GDACS | Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System |
| GFZ | German Research Centre for Geosciences |
| GL-60 | U.S. Treasury OFAC Venezuela General License 60 |
| GloFAS | Global Flood Awareness System |
| IASC | Inter-Agency Standing Committee |
| ICG | International Coordinating Group on Vaccine Provision |
| IDP | Internally displaced person |
| INAMEH | National Institute of Meteorology and Hydrology, Venezuela |
| INSIVUMEH | National Institute for Seismology, Volcanology, Meteorology and Hydrology, Guatemala |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| IPC | Integrated Food Security Phase Classification |
| IRC | International Rescue Committee |

| Acronym / term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| L/p/d | Litres per person per day |
| LAC | Latin America and the Caribbean |
| M (earthquake) | Earthquake magnitude as reported by the source agency |
| MHPSS | Mental health and psychosocial support |
| MSPP | Ministry of Public Health and Population, Haiti |
| NASA | National Aeronautics and Space Administration |
| NCD | Noncommunicable disease |
| NFI | Non-food item |
| NGO | Nongovernmental organization |
| NHC | National Hurricane Center |
| NOAA | National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration |
| OCHA | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| OCV | Oral cholera vaccine |
| OFAC | Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury |
| OTP | Outpatient therapeutic program |
| PAGER | Prompt Assessment of Global Earthquakes for Response |
| PAHO | Pan American Health Organization |
| Q1 | First quarter of the calendar year |
| Q4 | Fourth quarter of the calendar year |
| R4V | Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela |
| RUTF | Ready-to-use therapeutic food |
| SAM | Severe acute malnutrition |
| SAR | Search and rescue |
| TS | Tropical storm |
| U5 | Children under five years of age |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNDRR | United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| USAR | Urban search and rescue |
| USGS | U.S. Geological Survey |
| WASH | Water, sanitation and hygiene |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WHO | World Health Organization |
| WMO | World Meteorological Organization |

**END OF DOCUMENT — PACMO-OUT-2026-07 v1.0**